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Tantamount to Fraud?: 
Exploring Non-Disclosure of 
Genetic Information in Life 
Insurance Applications as 
Grounds for Policy Rescission 
Anya E.R. Prince† 
Abstract 
 
Many genetic counselors recommend that individuals secure 
desired insurance policies, such as life insurance, prior to undergoing 
predictive genetic testing. It has been argued, however, that this 
practice is “tantamount to fraud” and that failure to disclose genetic 
test results, or conspiring to secure a policy before testing, opens an 
individual up to legal recourse. This debate traps affected individuals 
in a Catch-22. If they apply for life insurance and disclose a genetic 
test result, they may be denied. If they apply without disclosing the 
information, they may have committed fraud. The consequences of life 
insurance fraud are significant: If fraud is found on an application, a 
life insurer can rescind the policy, in some cases even after the 
individual has passed away. Such a rescission could leave family 
members or beneficiaries without the benefits of the life insurance 
policy payment after the individual’s death and place them in in 
economic difficulty. 
Although it is clear that lying in response to a direct question 
about genetic testing would be tantamount to fraud, few, if any, life 
insurance applications currently include broad questions about genetic 
testing. This paper investigates whether non-disclosure of unasked for 
genetic information constitutes fraud and explores varying types of 
insurance questions that could conceivably be interpreted as seeking 
genetic information. Life insurance applicants generally have no duty 
to disclose unasked for information, including genetic information, on 
an application. However, given the complexities of genetic 
information, individuals may be exposed to fraud and rescission of 
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their life insurance policy despite honest attempts to truthfully and 
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Introduction: What should be disclosed? 
Three siblings—Timothy, Alfred, and Susan—recently learned 
that their father, who has colon cancer, has tested positive for a 
genetic variant associated with Lynch Syndrome. This links his cancer 
to a genetic, and possibly hereditary, cause. The father was adopted, 
so the siblings had not previously known of any family history of 
colon, endometrial, or other Lynch-associated cancers. All three 
siblings are in their thirties with families of their own, so they have 
begun to talk about the implications of their father’s diagnosis on 
their own lives. The eldest son, Timothy, has already visited a genetic 
counselor and testing showed he inherited the mutation from his 
father and has a significant risk of developing colon cancer. Susan is 
unsure whether she ever wants to get tested for the familial Lynch 
Syndrome mutation, but Alfred is interested and has called a genetic 
counselor to set up his own appointment. Because of the potential for 
genetic discrimination, the genetic counselor suggested that Alfred 
secure any desired life and other insurances prior to undergoing 
testing. All three siblings, who are all currently healthy, are now 
applying for life insurance. Each one disclosed their father’s cancer 
diagnosis in the family medical history section and have carefully read 
through and completed all of the other questions on the application. If 
Alfred, Timothy, and Susan do not include their father’s genetic test 
information on their applications, have they committed fraud or 
misrepresentation? 
This case example illustrates a potential situation that may 
become increasingly common for many Americans. Currently, though, 
the law provides little clear guidance on how these siblings should 
proceed. This article explores whether non-disclosure of a genetic test 
result on a life insurance application constitutes fraud and what the 
legal rules in this area mean for individuals like Alfred, Timothy, and 
Susan. 
A. Introduction 
The underlying premise of life insurance is that the timing of the 
insured event, the applicant’s death, is unknown. In actuality, 
however, an applicant’s current health status, lifestyle, and genetic 
information can both provide information about risk of an early death 
and be used by life insurers to make coverage decisions. Life insurers’ 
use of genetic information is particularly controversial. Some 
individuals feel that it is unfair to deny coverage based on immutable 
genetic information that they were born with and cannot change. In 
contrast, life insurance companies believe they cannot accurately 
classify risks and determine premium levels without genetic 
information as an essential tool. Due to the potential for adverse use 
of genetic information, many genetic counselors and advocacy groups 
suggest that, prior to undergoing genetic testing, patients obtain any 
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desired insurance.1 However, others argue that this practice is gaming 
the life insurance industry and that failing to disclose information 
about testing is deceitful or fraudulent. Application fraud and 
misrepresentation provide grounds for insurers to rescind the policy, 
in some situations even after the insured’s death. Although lying in 
response to a direct question about genetic testing would constitute 
fraud on an application, additional scenarios quickly obscure this 
bright line determination. Lack of clarity can lead to the problematic 
situation where well-intentioned applicants’ policies may be rescinded 
despite truthful application responses. 
Currently, many life insurance applications do not directly ask 
about genetic testing.2 If the life insurance application does not 
explicitly ask, is it fraud or misrepresentation not to disclose such 
information? If the individual has not yet undergone testing, but is 
considering it, does she have a duty to disclose this? From the life 
insurance perspective, what is the duty of the company to ask about 
information that it will take into consideration in underwriting? 
Should companies be able to have applications that are silent 
regarding genetics, but have the practice to rescind policies for fraud 
if a genetic predisposition comes to light in the future? 
This article explores when non-disclosure of genetic information 
may constitute fraud or misrepresentation allowing for life insurer 
rescission of the policy. It does not delve into analysis of fraud in 
other types of insurance, such as health, long-term care, and disability 
insurance. Health insurers are not allowed to underwrite on the basis 
of genetic or medical information, under both the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA), therefore concerns of fraud for 
nondisclosure are not an issue. Fraud and genetic information, 
however, remain a possible issue in insurances such as long-term care 
and disability insurance. Many of the discussions in this paper are 
relevant to these insurance realms. However, this paper focuses on life 
insurance because post-claim underwriting and rescission in life 
insurance impacts beneficiaries, not the individual insured—thus 
placing a unique burden on a third party uninvolved in the original 
contract. Additionally, since this rescission occurs after death, the 
insured individual has no opportunity to try to correct the situation 
 
1. Barbara Bowles Biesecker, Privacy in Genetic Counseling, in GENETIC 
SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC 
ERA 122, n. 37, (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997); Nicole L. Pfeffer et al., 
An Investigation of Genetic Counselors’ Discussions of Genetic 
Discrimination with Cancer Risk Patients, 12 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 
419, 427 (2003). 
2. Robert C. Green et al., GINA, Genetic Discrimination, and Genomic 
Medicine, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 397, 398 (2015). 
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by securing different insurance after the mistake is discovered.  
In 2008, Congress passed the GINA, the federal law that prohibits 
employers and health insurers from collecting and using genetic 
information in business decisions. Future legislation may limit 
companies’ abilities to use genetic information in life insurance 
decisions, as GINA does for health insurance. Until then, both 
insurance companies and applicants should practice transparency in 
order to ensure a fair and functioning system. 
Currently, applicants like Alfred, Timothy, and Susan risk a 
rescission of their life insurance policy if they fail to disclose genetic 
information — even if they are not directly asked for such information 
and even if they had no intent to hide genetic information from the 
insurer. This paper discusses these scenarios through eight substantive 
sections. Section II begins with a brief introduction into the basics of 
both genetic testing and life insurance. Sections III and IV provide an 
overview of some of the theoretical underpinnings of life insurance 
through a discussion of whether life insurance should be seen as a 
social good or an economic commodity, and through the introduction 
of two key principles: the solidarity principle and actuarial fairness. 
Next, in Section V, the paper turns to explore when and how life 
insurers may gain access to an applicant’s genetic information. 
Although life insurers are generally not directly asking for genetic 
information, there are a number of different ways that a company 
could receive such information in the underwriting process. Section VI 
presents the legal standards for when a life insurer can rescind a 
policy. In some situations, if an insurer discovers fraud or a material 
misrepresentation it can rescind a policy, even after the death of the 
individual, under a system of post-claims underwriting. Sections VII 
and VIII explore two elements of fraud and misrepresentation: 
materiality and intent. Through examples, this section begins to show 
the complications of applying these elements to the context of genetic 
information and insurance applications. Finally, Section IX presents 
types of questions that are commonly asked on life insurance 
applications to illustrate the ambiguities of how to answer broad 
questions in light of knowledge about one’s genetic risk. The paper 
concludes that individuals with genetic predispositions may be 
exposed to contract rescission based on fraud or material 
misrepresentation even when they make sincere attempts to truthfully 
answer application questions. To avoid this unfair scenario, life 
insurers should explicitly ask for genetic information on applications 
or be barred from using the non-disclosure of genetic information as 
grounds for policy rescissions. 
II. Genetic Testing and Life Insurance 
This paper explores the application of law at the intersection of 
life insurance and genetic technologies. As such, it is essential to have 
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a basic understanding of genetic testing and the type of information 
that one can learn from such testing, and of the life insurance 
industry and how it uses risk information in its business model. This 
section will present a brief primer on genetic testing and life 
insurance. 
A. Genetic Testing Primer 
Since the completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003, 
genetic testing in the U.S. has greatly expanded. Researchers and 
clinicians are now beginning to understand how certain genes are 
associated with certain diseases. It is common for individuals to have 
different genetic variants, or alterations, in their genes; however, some 
variants, often called mutations, are associated with genetic 
conditions or with certain diseases. These mutations can be detected 
through genetic testing. There are now genetic tests available for over 
5,000 genetic conditions and over 3,600 genes.3 
Genetic testing can provide information about a wide variety of 
conditions, from innocuous traits, such as the shape of one’s ear lobe, 
to serious diseases such as cancer or Huntington’s Disease. 
Additionally, genetic testing can be done for many reasons. A doctor 
may want to perform a genetic test in order to help diagnose 
symptoms, to help a patient make an informed reproductive decision, 
or to determine whether an individual has inherited a genetic 
predisposition to a condition. In this paper, the latter type of 
testing—predictive genetic testing—is most relevant. For some rare 
conditions, such as Huntington’s Disease, predictive genetic testing 
indicates that an individual will develop the disease. However, most 
predictive genetic tests indicate that an individual is at increased risk 
of developing the condition. Additionally, in the research and medical 
community, genetic variants are often categorized by whether or not 
they are medically actionable.4 Medical actionability refers to whether 
there are steps available for one to take to prevent or mitigate the 
condition if a predisposition is known. 
While this paper will primarily discuss genetic testing, genomic 
sequencing also provides individuals with information about risk and 
variants. Genomic screening examines a person’s entire genome, which 
is comprised of approximately 20,000 genes, whereas genetic testing is 
 
3. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for the NIH Genetic Testing 
Registry (GTR), NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gtr/ (last visited January 20, 2015). 
4. Jonathan S. Berg et al., Processes and Preliminary Outputs for 
Identification of Actionable Genes as Incidental Findings in Genomic 
Sequence Data in the Clinical Sequencing Exploratory Research 
Consortium, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 860, 865 (2013). 
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used to examine a targeted section of the genome.5 Currently, 
individuals generally undergo targeted genetic testing based on 
symptoms or a family history; however, due to decreasing costs of 
sequencing, genomic testing is increasingly being used in the clinic to 
assist in diagnosis. 
Genetic and genomic testing is increasingly being used in the 
clinical setting or ordered after an individual meets with genetic 
counselors about familial risk. Additionally, individuals may have 
undergone testing in a research study or, in the past, undertaken 
direct-to-consumer genetic testing.6 Overall, there are many reasons 
and ways that an individual may have knowledge of genetic 
information relevant to a life insurance company. 
B. Life Insurance Primer 
The first life insurance company in the United States began in 
1759 through the Presbyterian Synod of Philadelphia.7 Since that 
time, life insurance companies have grown to over a $120 billion dollar 
industry.8 Life insurance can be purchased either as an individual or a 
group policy, such as through an employer or trade association. In 
general, there are two main types of life insurance policies: term 
insurance and whole-life insurance. Term insurance is a policy where 
an individual is insured during a set time period that expires, such as 
10 years.9 This is generally the cheapest form of life insurance and 
premiums often remain level across the term, although will likely 
increase if the term is renewed for another period.10 Whole life 
insurance, in contrast, is a policy that lasts until it is terminated by 
the insured or until the death of the insured.11 The premiums are 
generally much more expensive than term life insurance; however, 
these premiums stay constant throughout the entirety of the policy. 
Additionally, this type of insurance accrues a cash value throughout 
 
5. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing (2012), 
Appendix II. 
6. See infra Section IX.A.2. 
7. J FRANCOIS OUTREVILLE, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE 24 
(1998). 
8. See FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL 
REPORT ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY (2013), http://www.treasury.gov/ 
initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/FIO%20Annual% 
20Report%202013.pdf. 
9. Steven Kass, Life Insurance Fundamentals, in UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 2009, 233, at 236 (2009). 
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 239. 
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the life of the policy that can be borrowed against in later years.12 
In both term and whole life insurance, applications go through a 
process called underwriting. Underwriting is the system that takes 
knowledge about the insured object and assesses risk levels: whether 
the risk of a house to require repairs; of an individual to require 
medical care; or, in the case of life insurance, of an individual to pass 
away at a younger age than average. Thus, life insurance underwriters 
gather information about an applicant’s risk of death and place this 
individual into a risk classification.13 The higher the risk category, the 
higher the individual’s premiums are likely to be. For example, since 
smoking increases risk of death, individuals who smoke are placed in a 
non-standard risk category and assigned higher premium rates than 
non-smokers. Once a premium has been set, it stays the same for the 
life of the policy, whether the set time period for term life insurance 
or for the entire policy for whole life insurance.14 Thus, correctly 
identifying risk during the underwriting process is an essential 
component of the life insurance business. 
III. Life Insurance: A Social Good versus an Economic 
Commodity 
Life insurance has always featured prominently in the societal 
debate over the use of individuals’ genetic information to make 
business decisions. While the arguments about life insurance are 
similar to those in the realms of health insurance and employment, 
the life insurance context is distinguishable. One distinctive factor 
underlying the debate is whether one views life insurance primarily as 
a social right or an economic commodity.15 
A social good is one where there is a moral obligation to 
distribute the good equitably across society.16 The U.S. has many 
examples of goods that have been recognized as essential to society, 
such as the right to a free public education. The ACA recognized the 
importance of health insurance as a social good and greatly expanded 
 
12. See id. 
13. Robert K. Gleeson, Medical Underwriting, in GENETICS AND LIFE 
INSURANCE: MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND SOCIAL POLICY, 73, 87-88 
(Mark A. Rothstein ed. 2004). 
14. Id. at 83. 
15. Mark A. Rothstein & Carlton A. Hornung, Public Attitudes, in 
GENETICS AND LIFE INSURANCE: MEDICAL UNDERWRITING AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 20, 22 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 2004). 
16. James Mittra, Predictive Genetic Information and Access to Life 
Assurance: The Poverty of ‘Genetic Exceptionalism,’ 2 BIOSOCIETIES 
349, 352 (2007). 
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equitable access to coverage. Similarly, GINA recognized that it 
would be inequitable to deny individuals access to health insurance 
based on genetic information.17 In contrast, a commodity is a good 
that is sold on the open market and one where there is no moral duty 
for society to ensure equitable access.18 Life insurance sometimes is 
seen as a good that falls between a social good and a commodity, as 
there are arguments for classification of life insurance into both these 
categories.19 
A. Life Insurance as a Social Good 
Life insurance fulfills important public goals of preventing 
disruption and economic instability in the family of a decedent; 
therefore, many view it as an essential social good.20 These social 
goals, however, are challenged if some segments of society are 
prevented from accessing insurance.21 Losing an income can severely 
affect the fortunes of a family unit if there is no life insurance payout. 
If the person who passes away happens to be the sole breadwinner, 
the financial consequences can be even more dire.22 Even the death of 
a non-wage earner can threaten financial stability because of the costs 
associated with burial and probate.23 
Since life insurance helps to ensure financial stability across 
families and generations, barriers to accessing life insurance will 
 
17. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), Pub. 
L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C). 
18. Mittra, supra note 16, at 352-53. 
19. Id. 
20. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Privacy and Confidentiality: Why They Are 
So Hard to Protect, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 198, 200 (1998); see, e.g., 
Rothstein & Hornung, supra note 15, at 23 (quoting one study that 
found that 82.6% of those surveyed believed in a right to life insurance). 
21. MARCUS RADETZKI ET AL., GENES AND INSURANCE: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 42 (2003). 
22. See, e.g., LIFE INSURANCE AND MARKET RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 
(LIMRA), LIFE INSURANCE FACT SHEET (2014) [hereinafter LIMRA FACT 
SHEET],http://www.limra.com/uploadedFiles/limra.com/LIMRA_Root/
Posts/PR/LIAM/PDF/2014-LIAM-Fact-Sheet.pdf (noting that half of 
Americans would feel an impact from the death of a primary wage 
earner within six months and one third would feel an impact within one 
month). 
23. See, e.g., Geoff Williams, What to Do When There’s No Money for a 
Funeral, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/articles/2013/02/ 
20/what-to-do-when-theres-no-money-for-a-funeral (noting that the 
average cost of a funeral in 2012 was $7,775). 
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predominantly affect those in socio-economic classes that are already 
facing, or are at risk of facing, financial instability. Once an individual 
has reached a certain level of financial stability, life insurance is less 
of a necessary good for his or her family.24 Therefore, among those 
who need life insurance for financial stability, a denial based on 
genetic information adds one additional barrier of access to the social 
good.25 
Another common argument in this area hinges not on whether 
individuals have a civil or social right to life insurance, but on the 
very nature of genetic information itself. Genetic information is 
uniquely personal and, much like gender, race, or ethnicity, is 
immutable.26 From the individual rights advocate’s perspective, use of 
genetic information affronts personal privacy and liberty: Denying an 
individual a basic societal good because of a trait over which they 
have no control is inherently unfair.27 This view has been criticized as 
pandering to genetic exceptionalism28 because similar fairness 
arguments can be made about other underwriting factors. For 
example, although gender is also immutable, life insurance companies 
often have different aggregate rates for men and women.29 
 
24. See, e.g., LIMRA FACT SHEET, supra note 22 (noting that younger 
individuals will feel a financial impact from the death of a wage earner 
more than older individuals). 
25. This is not to say that denial based on a current condition such as 
cancer, diabetes, or heart disease would not also be a problematic 
barrier to access. Until there comes a time when society holds life 
insurance as an unalienable right for all individuals, there will be 
barriers that prevent some from accessing this good due to the business 
model of life insurance. While this is an unlikely policy leap in the life 
insurance arena, it mirrors the path of in health insurance where 
insurers were first barred from using genetic information to underwrite, 
and then, several years later, were barred from considering any medical 
information.  
26. Green et al., supra note 2, at 399. 
27. See, e.g., Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair 
Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 
KY. L.J. 503, 563 (1996); see also INE VAN HOYWEGHEN, RISKS IN THE 
MAKING: TRAVELS IN LIFE INSURANCE AND GENETICS 28 (Amsterdam 
University Press 2007); but see Mittra, supra note 16, at 356 (noting 
that although race is not an acceptable risk classification, there are 
many other contexts where one’s immutable trait is used for actuarial 
justification. “Insurers appear to care less about the cause of an 
applicant’s risk than they do the actuarial and statistical consequences 
of it.”). 
28. See James P. Evans & Wylie Burke, Genetic Exceptionalism. Too Much 
of a Good Thing?, 10 GENETICS IN MED. 500, 500 (2008). 
29. Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Anti-Discrimination 
Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 250 (2014). 
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Additionally, denying someone life insurance because of current 
medical conditions may also seem unfair to many in society. Despite 
the similarities between genetic information and other risk 
characteristics, it is still common for individuals to have particular 
indignation for insurer use of genetic information over other types of 
information. In line with this view, genetic discrimination may be 
conceptualized as anytime information is used to make an adverse 
decision, regardless of whether there is a legitimate business reason for 
doing so.30 
B. Life Insurance as an Economic Commodity 
In contrast to the social good model, use of genetic information by 
life insurance companies can be viewed as an economic business 
necessity.31 Under this view, life insurance is not a social entitlement 
because the individual benefits are different from other social rights. 
The inability to access employment and health insurance clearly 
harms individuals through the potential struggle to afford food and 
housing and the inability to access preventive healthcare services, 
leading to increased risk of sickness or death. The need for and the 
harm from not being able to access life insurance is much more 
attenuated. While the beneficiaries gain a monetary benefit in a life 
insurance policy, the benefit to the insured individual is indirect and 
intangible because life insurance benefits go to family members or 
other named beneficiaries after one’s death. Assuring that one’s family 
is financially cared for after one’s death is undoubtedly beneficial; 
however, because of the intangible nature of this security, losing this 
benefit may not rise to a civil rights injury. If a good is an economic 
commodity, there is not a moral duty to ensure equitable access.32 
Insurers argue that since the principal purpose of life insurance is 
economic benefit, the primary goal of the insurance system should be 
protecting the companies’ financial viability. To maintain a viable 
enterprise, it is vital for insurance companies to know enough about 
what, or who, they are insuring to classify it into the appropriate risk 
category—and therefore the correct premium level. If the life 
insurance underwriters miscalculate this risk, the company must pay 
unexpected benefits without collecting additional years’ worth of 
premiums and without charging the adjusted higher premium based 
 
30. See, e.g.,Yann Joly et al., Genetic Discrimination and Life Insurance: A 
Systematic Review of the Evidence, 11 BMC MED. 1, 25 (2013). 
31. See Yann Joly et al., Life Insurance: Genomic Stratification and Risk 
Classification, 22 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 575, 575 (2014) (noting that 
the principal role of life insurance is to provide financial security to 
beneficiaries). 
32. Mittra, supra note 16, at 352-53. 
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on risk. If there is too much miscalculation in this direction, the 
company may quickly fail. 
Genetic information is understandably alluring for life insurance 
companies given the potential predictive value of genetic testing to 
foretell risk of certain hereditary diseases that are associated with a 
shortened lifespan. As more is understood about genetic causes of 
disease and as the cost of genetic testing decreases, a greater segment 
of society may undertake genetic testing. Simultaneously, as genomic 
medical knowledge increases, more will be known about associations 
between genetic variants and disease risk. Therefore, it is likely that 
as more people undergo testing, the predictive value of this 
information will also increase.  
If individuals learn of their own genetic risk, but do not inform 
insurance companies, the informational balance of power will tip 
towards applicants and skew proper risk classification; a problem that 
could lead to adverse selection. Adverse selection “refers to the 
theoretical tendency for low risk individuals to avoid or drop out of 
insurance pools, with the result that, absent countervailing efforts by 
administrators, insurance pools can be expected to contain a 
disproportionate percentage of high risk individuals.”33 It also causes 
improper risk classification when asymmetrical information between 
insurance applicants and companies allows individuals at high risk to 
apply for greater insurance coverage at premium levels of those with 
average risk.34 Due to fears of adverse selection, life insurance 
companies argue that they need to know every piece of medical and 
other risk information that the individual knows. 
C. Unanswered Debate 
The debate over whether life insurance is a social good or 
economic commodity raises many broader policy considerations. Is it 
fair to deny life insurance to those individuals who happen to have an 
identified genetic predisposition?35 Will the fear of genetic 
discrimination, as broadly conceptualized by society, stop individuals 
from undergoing genetic testing that could lead to important 
preventive measures? Should policy makers step in to protect these 
 
33. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection 
and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 371, 373 (2002). 
34. VAN HOYWEGHEN, supra note 27, at 11. 
35. For a discussion on the tensions between actuarial fairness and genetic 
determinism, see Saurabh Jha, Punishing the Lemon: The Ethics of 
Actuarial Fairness, 9 J. AM. C. RADIOLOGY 887, 889 (2012); see also 
Baker, supra note 33, at 394 (arguing that, in the case of genetics, “low 
risk” individuals “may be only one technological innovation away from 
losing his or her privileged status—the reality that lies behind the 
widespread concern with genetic testing by insurance companies.”). 
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individual interests at the risk of detrimentally affecting the entire life 
insurance enterprise? Overall, should legislatures protect against 
genetic discrimination in life insurance to firmly establish life 
insurance as a social right or should legislatures allow insurers to 
collect and use genetic information in order to protect the economic 
viability of the companies? 
These broader policy questions continue to be debated at both the 
state and federal levels. There has been much discussion about 
whether GINA should be expanded to life and other insurers. While 
there is some movement on this front, given the current Congressional 
climate, it is relatively unlikely that such legislation will pass anytime 
soon. As such, there is currently no federal legislation that definitively 
clarifies whether life insurance is a social good or strictly an economic 
commodity in the U.S. 
IV. The Solidarity Principle and Actuarial Fairness 
Insurance simultaneously relies on two somewhat competing 
visions of distributive justice—the solidarity principle and actuarial 
fairness.36 The solidarity principle undergirds the very reason for 
insurance overall: An insurance system is essentially a redistribution 
system transferring money from the lucky to the unlucky. Although 
all insurance members pay a premium to protect against the risk of 
loss, only some will ultimately need the protection.37 An early 
insurance entrepreneur framed the mutual support aspects of the 
system: 
It is from this point of view that [the system of insurance] 
presents society a union for mutual aid, of the fortunate and 
unfortunate, where those only who need it receive aid, and those 
only who can afford it are put to expense. Thus, while the 
aggregate of human suffering and calamity remains unremoved, 
human ingenuity and cooperation equalize the distribution of 
this fearful aggregate, and alleviate the terrors of uncertainty.38 
The solidarity model presupposes that risk is uncertain: why else 
would an individual risk a redistribution of her money to another if 
she did not believe that under an equally possible scenario she could 
potentially be the recipient of another’s money? In reality, some 
 
36. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 33, at 373; Jha, supra note 35; Deborah A. 
Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y L. 287 (1993). 
37. See Baker, supra note 33, at 372. 
38. Id. at 372 (citing D.R. Jaques, Society on the Basis of Mutual Life 
Insurance, HUNT’S MERCHANT MAG. & COM REV. 16, 152-53 (1849)). 
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information about the insured risk is available. A person who smokes 
is more likely to face chronic illness or early death than a non-smoker; 
a person with cancer is more likely to die sooner than one who is 
healthy; and a person who works in a factory is more likely to have a 
job-related accident than one who works in an office building. While 
an individual’s risk of early death cannot be perfectly predicted, 
general population statistics regarding factors such as smoking habits, 
health, demographics, and family health history, can help insurance 
companies categorize people into risk groups. 
Insurers describe the need to classify risk in moralistic terms. It 
would be patently unfair, they argue, for those with low risk to 
bankroll the losses of those with higher risk.39 Insurance companies 
categorize risk to guarantee actuarial fairness—the idea that those 
with equal risks are treated equally.40 This ensures that those with 
higher risk pay higher premiums so that those with lower risk do not 
pay an unfair share of premiums. From this business perspective, 
“discrimination” is conceptualized, not as any adverse decision, but as 
irrationally categorizing risk.41 A decision made with no statistical 
justification would be actuarially unfair and discriminatory. As long 
as equal risks are treated equally, differentiating between individuals 
is fair. Thus, denying insurance or charging higher premiums based on 
sound actuarial data is not only fair, but also a legitimate business 
 
39. Stone, supra note 36, at 288; Xavier Landes, How Fair Is Actuarial 
Fairness?, J. BUS. ETHICS 519, 522 (2014) (“Fairness directly relates to 
the moral ideal of insurance as seen by the industry”). 
40. Landes, supra note 39, at 521; Of course, the very idea of precise risk 
classification can undermine the whole concept of a solidarity model of 
insurance. If insurance companies are able to get a precise risk profile 
about an individual from health, social, and genetic information, there is 
the threat that individuals will be so micro-categorized that each person 
is paying for their exact fair share. This, however, is the antithesis of 
the solidarity motivations of insurance because there would be little to 
no uncertainty left in the process. “In fact, in a world of perfect 
predictive information, there would be no need and no market demand 
for insurance, because no one would stand to gain by ‘beating the 
odds.’” Stone, supra note 36, at 294. 
41. See, e.g., John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discriminiation in a Time of False 
Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 367 (2002) (noting that generally, 
the term “discrimination” in insurance is “not a term of approbation”); 
see also Landes, supra note 39, at 521 (defining unfair discrimination as 
when equal risks are treated differently); throughout this paper, 
“discrimination” will refer to the broader societal conception of 
discrimination—where genetic information is used to make an adverse 
decision. For any reference to the insurance company standard of “fair 
discrimination” and “unfair discrimination,” this paper will refer to a 
presence or lack of actuarial justification, fair or unfair underwriting, or 
reference to statistical accuracy or fallacy.  
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necessity.42 
Although insurers frame actuarial justification in moral terms of 
fairness, underwriting is an amoral process focused on statistical rigor 
and mathematical calculation.43 In reality, insurers have used several 
mathematically justified underwriting risk factors without considering 
broader moral consequences.44 For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
several insurers’ practices exemplified the value-laden consequences 
that stem from purely mathematical risk assessments. These insurers 
denied life, health, and disability insurance to women who had 
experienced intimate partner violence. The insurers argued that the 
decision to use a history of abuse as a determining risk factor was 
actuarially justified because, statistically, these women were more 
likely to file insurance claims.45 During the ensuing controversy and 
uproar following revelation of this widespread practice, many states 
introduced legislation banning it; however, in several states, this form 
of actuarial underwriting remains unrestricted in life and disability 
insurance.46 
Similarly, although the practice has been universally stopped, in 
the past it was common for insurers to classify black applicants in 
higher risk categories than fellow white applicants, all else being 
equal.47 As in the case with domestic violence, many life insurance risk 
factors and race are statistically associated. However, these insurance 
decisions, although “actuarially fair,” violate an inherent social and 
 
42. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 39, at 521. 
43. Jha, supra note 35, at 889 (explaining that “[a]ctuarial pricing is amoral. 
It looks only at the risk of the individual, not how the risk was 
acquired.”). 
44. Mittra, supra note 16, at 355 (“However, the implicit argument that 
there is no moral ambiguity if actuarially relevant risk data is used to 
differentiate policyholders is increasingly being challenged. Many rightly 
argue that judgments of actuarial fairness are inherently subjective and 
choice of fairness criteria is often a matter of social philosophy rather 
than actuarial science.”). 
45. Baker, supra note 33, at 392. 
46. Domestic Violence in Insurance, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (2010), 
http://hrc.nwlc.org/policy-indicators/domestic-violence-insurance; see 
also Jenny Gold, Domestic Abuse Victims Struggle with Another Blow: 
Difficulty Getting Health Insurance, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 7, 
2009), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/domestic-abuse/. The ACA 
effectively banned this practice in health insurance by retricting the use 
of preexisting condition exclusions. 
47. Jill Gaulding, Race Sex and Genetic Discrimination in Insurance: 
What’s Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1646, 1659-60 (1994); see also 
Mittra, supra note 16, at 356 (showing that race is also not allowed as 
an actuarial category in European insurance models). 
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moral fairness.48 
These tensions between actuarial and social fairness mirror those 
that are playing out in arguments regarding underwriting on the basis 
of genetic information.49 Insurers are loathe to lose access to genetic 
data that can inform their statistical risk prediction models; 
simultaneously, individuals are appalled by denials of an important 
social good based on unfortunate circumstances or immutable traits 
often tenuously tied to risk. Until state or federal legislatures declare 
genetic information an unfair and illegal underwriting tool, insurance 
companies will continue to explore the use of an applicant’s genetic 
data for underwriting. Indeed, these companies may even be required 
to use genetic information because not doing so would be 
“discriminatory.” 
V. Acquiring Genetic Information 
Although the overall value of genetic information as an 
underwriting tool in life insurance remains contested, the underlying 
practical question is whether insurance companies are collecting 
genetic information? The obvious follow-up to this question is the 
following: If they are collecting it, are they using it? And, if so, for 
what purpose? 
 
48. Representatives on the insurance underwriting side have also argued the 
distinction between actuarial fairness and societal fairness. “The 
acceptability of underwriting procedures is societally determined and a 
profession which fails to recognize and make allowances for this may 
find itself ostracized and increasingly ignored.” Thomas A. Moultrie & 
R. Guy Thomas, The Right to Underwrite? An Actuarial Perspective 
with a Difference, 5 J. ACTUARIAL PRAC. 125, 137 (1997). In this way, 
actuarial justification is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
fairness. 
49. VAN HOYWEGHEN, supra note 27, at 39 (“[T]he actuarial profession has 
no monopoly on wisdom when society comes to decide between 
competing interpretations of fairness.”)(citation omitted); Genetic 
information is by no means the only continuing potentially problematic 
basis for insurance underwriting. There are many different items 
associated with increased risk that may be linked to a person’s socio-
economic status in troublesome ways. For example, in his review of US 
underwriting practices, Allen Klein delineates several factors that 
insurers could utilize in risk classification in the future, such as 
environmental exposure, geographic location, income levels, and diet and 
exercise. Allen M. Klein, Life Insurance Underwriting in the United 
States–Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 18 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 486, 
489-99 (2013). Under the social right theory and solidarity model of life 
insurance, these risk categories are problematic because they may 
disproportionately affect individuals of lower socio-economic status, thus 
further threaten economic stability of these groups. 
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A. Can Life Insurers Legally Ask for and Use Genetic Information? 
GINA regulates covered employers and health insurers in two 
main ways: by prohibiting the use of genetic information to make 
adverse decisions, such as firing employees or raising insurance 
premiums; and by generally prohibiting the collection of genetic 
information.50 The law broadly defines genetic information as the 
results of genetic testing, participation in genetic research, use of 
genetic services such as genetic counseling, and family medical 
history.51 The legislation’s goal, in part, was to assuage the public’s 
fear of genetic discrimination—which was preventing individuals from 
having genetic testing and participating in research.52 While quite 
broad in how it defines genetic information and what activities it 
prohibits, GINA is limited in scope: it does not apply to life, long-
term care, and disability insurers. “This [was] not the result of an 
oversight: a strategic decision was made early on to recognize the very 
distinct markets, social purposes, risks of adverse selection, and bodies 
of relevant law governing these types of insurance.”53 Thus, due to 
compromises during GINA’s thirteen-year legislative journey, the final 
bill did not include these insurers in the legislation despite similar fear 
of discrimination.  
While there is no federal legislation pertaining to the use of 
genetic information in life insurance, there is a patchwork of 
applicable state laws. Overwhelmingly, state law does not ban the use; 
however, most states regulate the use. These regulations are generally 
meager and often fail to provide individuals with meaningful 
protections against discrimination beyond existing state law. For 
example, many states prohibit life insurers from, on the basis of 
genetic information, “unfairly” discriminating against applicants.54 In 
this legal context, “unfair” does not refer to the broader societal 
conception of discrimination, but merely requires life insurers to have 
 
50. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 2008 P.L. 110-223, 
CRS-1, CRS-10 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 
42 U.S.C.) 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-91 (2011). 
52. David Resnick, GINA – A Big Step Toward Personalized Medicine, 
BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL (Aug. 21, 2008) 
http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/mass-high-tech/2008/08/gina-
-a-big-step-toward-personalzed-medicine.html?page=all. 
53. Kathy L. Hudson et al., Keeping Pace with the Times—the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2661, 2663 (2008). 
54. Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection of Genetic Information-
One Size Privacy of Property Models May Not Fit All, 79 BROOK. L. 
REV. 175, 210 (2013). 
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actuarial justification for any decisions. Although these laws attempt 
to specifically address the use of genetic information in life insurance, 
they do not provide any additional protection to the already existing 
actuarial requirements.55 Thus, while these laws prevent an insurance 
company from applying a higher premium rate based on a genetic 
variant unassociated with increased risk of death, they do nothing to 
stop insurers from doing the very thing that worries applicants—
denying insurance based on a genetic predisposition to a disease. 
Other types of state laws do not directly address discrimination 
concerns, but provide privacy protections to individuals. For example, 
in some states, life insurance companies cannot require applicants to 
undergo genetic testing.56 In other states, insurers can require the 
applicant to undergo genetic testing, but must first obtain informed 
consent.57 These laws may prevent unwanted genetic testing from 
occurring without an individual’s knowledge; however, they do not 
prevent life insurers from using genetic information to charge higher 
rates or to deny insurance. 
Among those states that regulate genetic information and life 
insurance, California currently has the strongest protections. In 2011, 
 
55. Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Exceptionalism and Legislative Pragmatism, 
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 63 (2007) (noting that “[t]he new laws thus 
appear to address the issue of genetics and life insurance but actually 
afford no new protections”); Holmes, supra note 27, at 552; e.g., N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 24-21-4(C) (West 2005) (allowing insurers to use genetic 
information if based on “sound actuarial principles”); see also ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448(E) (2009) (use of a genetic condition to reject 
an application or alter the premiums, terms, or conditions of the policy 
is unfair discrimination unless the insurer can establish a basis for a 
“substantial difference” in claims). The redundancy of these statutes 
illustrates one potential problem of genetic exceptionalism. Genetic 
exceptionalism is a hindrance in this arena because people may believe 
that legislatures are strongly addressing their concerns of genetic 
discrimination; however, in reality, such legislation likely does not add 
any additional protections beyond other medical and social information. 
56. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 120E (West 2011) (banning 
insurers from requiring individuals to undergo genetic testing as a 
condition for coverage); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9334(a)(1) (1997) 
(restricting policies underwritten on the basis of a requirement to 
undergo genetic testing); but see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-
C(3)(B) (2009) (noting that genetic tests can be required in insurance as 
long as the individual is notified and given the option to receive the 
results). 
57. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02(A) (1997) (requiring 
written informed consent for an insurer to perform a genetic test); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139(5) (West 1995) (requiring written informed 
consent that is approved by the Comissioner for insurers to test); N.Y. 
INS. LAW § 2615(a) (McKinney 2005) (requiring written informed 
consent prior to testing). 
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the California legislature passed Cal-GINA, a law that modified the 
Unruh Civil Rights Act58 to add genetic information as a protected 
class. Cal-GINA adopted GINA’s broad definition of genetic 
information, and included genetic test results, family medical history, 
and use of genetic services in the definition.59 Therefore, regardless of 
their genetic information and family history, all individuals are 
“entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind 
whatsoever.”60 Unruh provides individuals full accommodations to all 
businesses, including insurance companies.61 This guarantee applies to 
both access to the business and pricing differentials.62 However, there 
is no Unruh violation if pricing differentials are “reasonable”—those 
based on actuarial justification.63 This means that although California 
is the state with the strongest protections because insurers cannot use 
genetic information—including family history—to deny life insurance, 
life insurers may still able to legally use genetic information to charge 
variable premium rates. 
B. Do Life Insurers Ask for Genetic Information? 
Life insurance companies do not broadly advertise underwriting 
practices, application questions, or other business aspects of the 
industry. The companies across the U.S. have little transparency, in 
part, because underwriting practices are closely linked to the 
companies’ market competition strategies.64 Although overall company 
practices are difficult to gather, interviews with life insurance industry 
groups and companies regarding the collection of genetic information 
illuminate current practices.65 
Life insurers have not begun to widely collect information about 
 
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(e)(2) (West 2011). 
59. Cal. Gov’t Code § 1292(i). 
60. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CIV. CODE. at § 51(b) (West 2011). 
61. Id.; CAL. INS. CODE § 1861.03(a) (West 1990). 
62. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
63. Id. at 1050-52. (finding that the insurer’s assigned mortality rating due 
to the applicant’s fascioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy was not 
actuarially sound and was therefore unreasonable and a violation of 
Unruh, but a price differential would not have been a violation if it was 
actuarially based and reasonable). 
64. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 36, at 306-07. 
65. See, e.g., Kira Peikoff, Fearing Punishment for Bad Genes, N.Y. TIMES 
(April 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/science/fearing-
punishment-for-bad-genes.html?_r=0. 
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genetic testing during the application process.66 Each company does 
not want to be the first to adopt questioning for two likely reasons: 
they fear negative publicity from consumers; and they want to attract 
new customers by using easy, streamlined application procedures. 67 
Lack of collection is currently unlikely to skew actuarial 
determinations because relatively few individuals have taken genetic 
tests and there are few genetic tests for which a positive result 
strongly or definitively predicts the risk of disease. Instead, companies 
create risk profiles for each applicant based upon personal health 
information, behavioral patterns, and—the proxy for genetic 
information—family history. Family history can help to predict the 
risk of hereditary disease and is a socially established and acceptable 
way for insurers to obtain risk information.68 
C. Are Life Insurers Accessing Genetic Information? 
Although life insurers are not yet directly asking for genetic 
information on applications on a widespread basis, there are several 
other ways that the application and underwriting process can bring 
this information to light. First, if an individual’s application responses 
raise any red flags, or if there is a high dollar amount of insurance 
requested, the underwriter may request the applicant’s medical 
records or, with the applicant’s permission, send questions to the 
applicant’s doctor.69 The medical records or conversation with the 
 
66. Roberta B. Meyer, The Insurer Perspective, in GENETICS AND LIFE 
INSURANCE 30, 36 (M. A. Rothstein ed. 2004) (noting that no insurers 
were known to explicitly ask about testing or to require testing); but see 
Rothstein, supra note 20, at 200 (noting that there is evidence that life 
insurers have begun to use genetic information that they do get access 
to). 
67. Peikoff, supra note 65; VAN HOYWEGHEN, supra note 27, at 57 (noting 
that the medical questionnaire is part of the marketing scheme to 
attract customers. “A company may also be after higher sales by 
offering more flexible underwriting guidelines, or it may target young 
affluent clients by not requiring any underwriting at all in order to lure 
them into purchasing its other products as well.”). 
68. But see Robert Klitzman et al., Should Life Insurers Have Access to 
Genetic Test Results?, 312 JAMA 1855, 1855 (2014) (noting that 
genetic data for some conditions is more accurate than family history 
alone). 
69. See, e.g., Jean E. McEwen et al., A Survey of Medical Directors of Life 
Insurance Companies Concerning Use of Genetic Information, 53 AM. J. 
HUM. GENETICS 33, 34-35 (1993); Holmes, supra note 27, at 561 (citing 
Theresa E. Morelli, Genetic Discrimination by Insurers: Legal 
Protections Needed From Abuse of Biotechnology, Health Span, Sept. 
1992, at 8.) (“More than one month later and without any prior notice, 
the insurer returned my premium without giving me a reason. …an 
underwriter informed me of the reason for the denial: my father may 
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doctor can reveal past genetic test results or referrals to genetic 
counselors.70 
Second, in some situations the underwriter requests that 
applicants undergo a medical exam.71 There is no current evidence 
that insurer-contracted physicians conducting these exams order 
genetic tests. However, the physician may elicit genetic information 
through questions asked during the exam. This may be the case even 
if the question is not specifically about genetics or family history. For 
example, a broad question about medication use can reveal a potential 
predisposition if the applicant is taking Tamoxifin, a medication that 
is used to lower the risk of developing cancer for BRCA-positive 
individuals.  
Finally, life insurance companies may obtain information about an 
applicant’s genetic make-up through the Medical Information Bureau 
(MIB). The MIB is a clearinghouse of information about individuals 
who have applied for multiple types of insurance. When an individual 
applies for disability insurance, for example, that company may send 
the MIB the application information. If the same individual then 
applies for life insurance a few years later, the life insurance company 
can use the MIB to verify her application answers. The purpose of the 
MIB is to allow insurers to “detect possible inconsistencies, 
irregularities, or omissions in the information submitted by an 
individual in applications to other companies.”72 Thus, the life insurer 
will receive genetic information without directly asking the applicant 
if it is housed in the applicant’s MIB file. 
As it currently stands, it is not clear whether or not life insurers 
intend to use the non-disclosure of unasked-for genetic information as 
grounds for rescission, although there have been attempted rescissions 
based on unasked for medical information.73 Therefore, it is a realistic 
possibility. Even if—or when—insurers begin to ask for genetic 
information, they may not start using such information for 
underwriting decisions immediately. Instead, insurers may track 
 
have Huntington’s Disease, a hereditary illness. I remember that the 
application did not ask if I had a genetic disorder or was at risk for one. 
The insurer got my father’s diagnosis from my doctor.”). 
70. Gleeson, supra note 13, at 91-92 (noting that underwriters often discover 
genetic information in clinical records). 
71. McEwen et al., supra note 69, at 34-35 
72. Harry Ostrer et al., Insurance and Genetic Testing: Where Are We 
Now?, 52 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 565, 566 (1993). 
73. See, e.g., 6A Couch on Insurance § 88.1 (noting that “statements and 
nondisclosures regarding health are one of the most frequent bases for 
an insurer attempting to avoid coverage on the ground of 
misrepresentations, breach of warranties, or failure of conditions.”) 
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genetic information from those already in the insurance pool and 
correlate this information with life spans and mortality rates. In this 
way, insurance companies can amass their own evidence base to 
determine whether a certain genetic variant is associated with 
increased mortality.74 However, due to the lack of insurer 
transparency, an applicant has no assurance before applying whether 
the company will use genetic information for immediate coverage 
decisions, save the information for future statistical analysis, or ignore 
the information completely. 
Although life insurance companies could gain access to genetic 
information through medical records, medical examinations, or the 
MIB, these processes are expensive. Therefore, the insurer is 
incentivized to approve the policy based on the application alone. An 
application is likely to be approved without further interrogation if it 
does not raise any significant red flags—a situation that may be more 
likely in the case of a healthy asymptomatic individual with a genetic 
predisposition. In some situations, these approvals are granted 
automatically, without direct human involvement: “Rules are pre-
programmed into the software. If the proposed insured meets the pre-
determined guidelines, they are not only approved for coverage; in 
some cases, the policy is also issued immediately upon a favourable 
system review. Depending on the rules, 30%-70% of policies are 
typically approved by the system as just described.”75 This 
streamlined application process is more likely to create situations 
where applicants are not explicitly asked about genetic information. 
VI. Rescissions 
A. Rescissions and Post-Claims Underwriting 
If a life insurance company discovers a misrepresentation on the 
original application after a policy is already in place, it may attempt 
to rescind the policy. This can occur at any time after a policy is 
approved, even after the insured has died.76 Post-claims underwriting, 
the process of going back and carefully reviewing an insurance policy 
after a beneficiary files a claim, is a lawful albeit controversial 
 
74. For example, this is what occurred in the underwriting of smoking risk. 
Once insurers began to gather information on smoking habits they could 
determine the actuarial relevancy from the collected evidence. VAN 
HOYWEGHEN, supra note 27, at 75. 
75. Klein, supra note 49, at 492. 
76. But see infra Section VI.C. for a discussion of when incontestability 
clauses prevent life insurers from rescinding policies many years after 
they go into force. 
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business practice.77 When an application for life insurance is followed 
closely by the death of the newly insured, the insurance company may 
suspect that the applicant had a reason to believe that his death was 
looming, and that he failed to disclose it to the company. Thus, post-
claims underwriting is especially likely to occur if the insured passed 
away shortly after the application. 
Some insurance companies strategically rely on post-claims 
underwriting as a business strategy.78 For example, in 2009, more than 
5,000 life insurance claims were denied or disputed, two-thirds on 
grounds of misrepresentation.79 The companies opt to limit 
underwriting on the front end so that applications are processed 
quickly, customers are lured in, and costly application inquiries into 
medical records and physical exams are avoided. After a death has 
occurred, the company can then interrogate the claims and original 
application in depth. If the company finds grounds for a rescission at 
this stage, it can save money by cancelling the policy and refunding 
past premiums paid, rather than paying the claim benefits.80 This 
strategy is also effective at saving money for insurers because many 
policies never result in claims. In term life insurance, if a person is 
still alive after the term is finished, the insurance company has 
collected the premiums without ever having to pay a claim.81 An 
insurer that relies on a system of post-claims underwriting to catch 
misrepresentations on term life applications would thus avoid paying 
for extensive underwriting because no claim was ever initiated, 
obviating the need for any post-claim investigation. 
While this practice is economically logical for life insurers, it is 
unfair to applicants, policyholders, and their beneficiaries—especially 
in the case of innocent mistake on an application. Post-claims 
underwriting in the case of innocent mistake prevents the individual 
from correcting the error during her lifetime and ensuring benefits for 
her family. Additionally, post-claims underwriting places the burden 
of litigation and loss of benefits on the beneficiary, not the 
 
77. See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 
102 W. VA. L. REV. 809, 813-14 (1999). 
78. See, e.g., id. at 823-24. 
79. Lisa Girion & Sandra Poindexter, Flaws Can Cancel Life Insurance — 
After Death, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2010), available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/21/local/la-me-life-insure-
20101121. 
80. Cady & Gates, supra note 77, at 818. 
81. Steven Kass, Life Insurance Fundamentals, in UNDERSTANDING 
INSURANCE LAW 2009, 236 (Laura A. Foggan & Suzan F. Charlton 
eds., 2009) 
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applicant—a burden that can have dire financial consequences.82 
Regardless of the ethics of this strategy, it will only be effective in the 
context of genetic information if failure to disclose genetic information 
on an application legally constitutes grounds for rescission. 
B. Legal Grounds for Rescission of Life Insurance Policies 
Misrepresentation on an insurance application may constitute 
sufficient grounds for rescission of a life insurance policy. A 
misrepresentation is “an assertion that is not in accord with the 
facts,”83 and in some cases, that can include non-disclosure of facts.84 
An insurance policy is voidable if there is a misrepresentation that is 
either fraudulent or material.85 A fraudulent misrepresentation occurs 
when an individual knowingly makes a false assertion with the intent 
to deceive the other party.86 A misrepresentation is material if the 
statement prompts an individual to accept a contract that they 
otherwise may not have.87 
In order for an insurance company to rescind a policy, they must 
show four elements: 1) that there was a misrepresentation; 2) that the 
misrepresentation was either fraudulent or material; 3) that the 
insurer actually relied on the misrepresentation as an inducement to 
accept the application; and 4) that the reliance was justified.88 This 
paper begins with the assumption that the first element is satisfied 
because there was either a false assertion or omission regarding the 
applicant’s genetic information and will focus on the second element 
of proof. The paper will not focus on actual or justifiable reliance, the 
third and fourth elements, as these elements are beyond the discussion 
of whether failure to disclose genetic information in an application is 
fraudulent or a misrepresentation.  
Thus, the main inquiries for this paper are whether or not the 
misrepresentation was material and whether or not the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent. State law varies regarding the 
 
82. Id. at 818-19; see also Girion & Poindexter, supra note 79 (reporting on 
a woman who lost her home and had to take a new job to make ends 
meet after her husband died and his life insurance policy was rescinded). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1981). 
84. Id. at § 161; 6 Couch on Insurance § 81:6 (3d ed., rev. 2012). 
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. b. 
86. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 461 (3d pocket ed. 2006) (defining fraudulent 
misrepresentation as “a false statement that is known to be false or is 
made recklessly – without knowing or caring whether it is true or false – 
and that is intended to induce a party to detrimentally rely on it.”). 
87. See infra section VII. 
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159-172 (1981). 
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whether both elements are needed or whether one is sufficient. For 
example, in some states, any material misrepresentation is sufficient 
grounds for rescission, but other states require a showing of both an 
intent to deceive and materiality.89 However, this paper will follow the 
elements of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts that a finding of 
either intent or materiality is sufficient grounds for rescission so that 
it can discuss each element separately in a clear fashion.90  
C. Incontestability Clauses  
Although life insurance companies are allowed to perform post-
claims underwriting, most states oblige insurance contracts to have 
incontestability clauses.91 Incontestability clauses require insurers to 
challenge the validity of a policy within a certain time frame, usually 
two years.92 If an insurer fails to bring a rescission claim prior to this 
time, it will have waived its ability to do so. 
The purpose of incontestability clauses is to reassure applicants 
that, after a certain time frame, they will not be denied benefits in 
the future. In this way, one of the original motivations of 
incontestability clauses was to generally prevent insurers from 
undertaking the type of post-claim underwriting that is unfair to the 
individuals and their beneficiaries. “[The incontestability clause] 
prevents an insurer from lulling the insured, by inaction into fancied 
security during the time when the facts could best be ascertained and 
proved, only to litigate them belatedly, possibly after the death of the 
insured.”93 
However, there is a growing trend in state law to have an 
incontestability clause exception for fraud. Under these provisions, an 
insurance contract may be contested within the set time period after 
the policy is approved; after that period, an insurer can only seek to 
rescind the policy on grounds of the more stringent legal standard of 
proof of intent to deceive for fraud or fraudulent misrepresentation.94  
89. John Dwight Ingram, Misrepresentations in Applications for Insurance, 
14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 103, 103-06 (2005) (explaining that there are 
generally four bases for rescission: “1) any material misrepresentation; 2) 
intent to deceive or a material misrepresentation; 3) intent to deceive or 
an increase in the risk of loss; and 4) intent to deceive and materiality.” 
The last three bases generally require a combination of both an intent to 
deceive and materiality, although they differ in the type and strength of 
materiality).  
90. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 (1981). 
91. Ingram, supra note 89, at 112. 
92. Cady & Gates, supra note 77, at 850. 
93. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. De Nicola, 58 N.E.2d 841, 842 (Mass. 
1944). 
94. See, e.g., Ingram, supra note 89, at 112-13. 
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A minority of states allow for exceptions of incontestability clauses 
even when there has been no intent to deceive.95 
Thus, the implications of claiming that failure to disclose genetic 
information on an application is fraud are vast. If non-disclosure of 
genetic information is tantamount to fraud, life insurance policies 
could be rescinded years, even decades, after an application is filed. In 
the minority states where intent is not a requirement of the exception 
for incontestability clauses, a person could have their policy rescinded 
after their death, even in a situation where that applicant had no 
intent to deceive and tried to answer all questions truthfully. 
VII. Materiality 
Materiality hinges on whether a false statement will persuade an 
insurer to accept an application that they may not have otherwise 
accepted: “A misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to 
induce a reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker 
knows that it would be likely to induce the recipient to do so.”96 In 
the context of insurance, the question of materiality hinges on if, and 
how, the correct information would have changed the insurer’s risk 
calculation during the underwriting process, both in terms of 
accepting the application and setting premium rates.97 There are three 
main questions regarding issues of materiality that may arise in the 
context of genetic information and life insurance applications. First, 
must a genetic predisposition cause the death of the insured for there 
to be a post-claims rescission? Second, if genetic information fails to 
meet standards of actuarial justification, can it be material? Finally, 
can the insurance company argue that genetic information is material 
if they did not directly ask about it on the application?  
95. See, e.g., Ledley v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 651 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. 
1995) (noting that “[e]ven an innocent misrepresentation can constitute 
equitable fraud justifying rescission.”). 
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(2) (1981). 
97. See, e.g., Oade v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Michigan, 632 N.W. 2d 
126, 131 (Mich. 2001) (holding that a misrepresentation is material 
when it would have both caused a “rejection of the risk” or the 
“charging of an increased premium.”); Harper v. Fidelity and Guar. Life 
Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 1211, 1217 (Wyo. 2010) (noting that facts are 
material if they increase the risk so as to cause either denial of the 
application, higher premiums, or other conditions). States vary in 
whether they use a reasonable insurer standard or a subjective standard 
for determining materiality. Compare, e.g., W. Coast Life Ins. Co. v. 
Ward, 132 Cal. App. 4th 181, 187 (2005) (applying a subjective test of 
materiality, not one based on an “average reasonable” insurer, citing 
Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. v. Sogomonian, 243 Cal. Rptr. 639) 
with Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Snead, 499 S.E.2d 173, 176 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1998) (applying a “prudent insurer” standard).  
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A. Causality 
The underlying policy rationale for allowing insurance rescissions 
is that individuals should not be unjustifiably rewarded for making a 
misrepresentation on an application, especially a knowing one. If 
insurers would not have approved the application based on omitted 
information, why should they ultimately be responsible for paying the 
beneficiaries the claim? However, this logic is more attenuated when 
there is no causal relationship between the omitted risk factor and the 
eventual death. Therefore, some plaintiffs have argued that a 
misrepresentation can only be material if it causes or contributes to 
the insured’s claim.98 Others worry that a causality requirement could 
encourage fraud. “If the cause of loss is connected to the 
misrepresented fact, the insured has lost nothing, because he wouldn’t 
have had coverage anyway. If the cause of loss is not connected, he 
has coverage he otherwise couldn’t have obtained. Thus, he had 
nothing to lose by misrepresenting.”99 Perhaps in part due to this 
concern, the majority of states define materiality, not by what 
information is material to the insured event, but what information 
was material to the underwriting of the application.100 Only a 
minority of states—Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri and Rhode 
Island—requires that the misrepresented matter must have 
contributed to an insured’s death to be considered material.101 
This task of determining potential causality is especially difficult 
in situations where the omitted information is related to the death, 
but not necessarily causative. For example, in Derickson v. Fidelity 
Life Association, a life insurance beneficiary brought suit after the 
 
98. See, e.g., Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company v. Nittolo, 955 
F.Supp. 33 (D.N.J. 1997). 
99. Ingram, supra note 89, at 111. 
100. Id. (noting that “[i]n most jurisdictions, a misrepresentation is 
considered material and sufficient grounds for rescission or denial of a 
claim regardless of whether the fact misrepresented has any causal 
connection with the death or loss involved in the claim). The general 
policy behind this broad failure to adopt a causality standard is the idea 
that the insurer would not have offered the insurance policy at all if the 
material information had been properly provided. Therefore, the policy 
should be void ab initio and treated as invalid overall—regardless of the 
ultimate cause of death. 
101. Kathryn H. Vratil & Stacy M Andreas, The Misrepresentation Defense 
in Causal Relation States: A Primer, 26 TORT INSUR. LAW J. 832 (1991) 
(Note: The article discusses several other states, but these are not 
relevant to the life insurance context: Nebraska (statute only applies to 
accident and sickness insurance), Oklahoma (statute only applies to 
limited stock policies that are no longer offered in the state), New Jersey 
(a lower court interpreted an implicit causal relationship in the relevant 
statute, but the state supreme court reversed)). 
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insurer failed to pay the benefits on a $50,000 policy on the grounds 
of misrepresentation.102 When Christopher Derickson applied for a life 
insurance policy in 1992, he failed to disclose that his driver’s license 
had been suspended nine times and revoked four times due to reckless 
and negligent driving.103 In 1993, he died in a one-car accident 
following a period of being awake for approximately thirty-six hours 
during the birth of his son. The insurance company argued that Mr. 
Derickson’s negligent driving was the cause of his death; therefore, his 
misrepresentation on the application was material. The court, 
however, found that there was sufficient evidence to find that 
negligent driving was not the cause of death since a witness stated 
that Mr. Derickson was not driving recklessly when the accident 
occurred and remanded the case to the district court for a jury trial.104 
Similarly, in the context of genetic information, the question of 
causality cannot always be clearly determined. As will be discussed 
further below, the predictive value of many variants, especially novel 
ones that are ascertained through genomic sequencing, is currently 
very low.105 One method to determine the potential link between genes 
and common diseases is through genome-wide association studies 
(GWAS). GWAS search through large amounts of genomic sequences 
in order to discover markers that are associated with certain medical 
symptoms or conditions.106 These studies, however, predominately 
provide information about the correlation between conditions and 
genetic variants: They rarely provide information about causation.107 
For example, GWAS studies have found 35 common genetic 
variants that are associated with coronary artery disease (CAD), the 
leading cause of death worldwide.108 However, these variants account 
for less than 4% of the differences between the occurrences of CAD 
among individuals. Lifestyle, environmental, and other unknown 
genetic factors explain 96% of the reason why one given individual 
will develop CAD and another will not.109 Thus, if an individual with 
 
102. Derickson v. Fidelity Life Ass’n, 77 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 1996).. 
103. Id. at 264. 
104. Id. at 264-66. 
105. See infra Section VII.B. 
106. John Hardy & Andrew Singleton, Genomewide Association Studies and 
Human Disease, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1759, 1760 (2009). 
107. See, e.g., id. at 1072 (noting that GWAS is most likely to find indirect 
associations). 
108. John F. Peden & Martin Farrall, Thirty-Five Common Variants for 
Coronary Artery Disease: The Fruits of Much Collaborative Labour, 20 
HUMAN MOLECULAR GENETICS R198, R200 (2011). 
109. Id. at R198. 
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one of these variants dies from heart disease, it may be difficult for 
the insurance company to prove that it was the genetic variant that 
caused the death, and not lifestyle or environmental factors. 
Additionally, many genes are pleiotropic: they are associated with 
multiple, seemingly unrelated, symptoms or conditions.110 These genes 
may be strongly associated with one or two conditions, but weakly 
associated with several others. For example, the pathogenic variants 
causing Lynch Syndrome are strongly associated with colon cancer, 
however their association with breast cancer is debated.111 Imagine if 
Susan from our case example turns out to have Lynch Syndrome and 
subsequently dies of breast cancer. Life insurers may not be able to 
definitively prove that her genetic mutation caused her breast cancer, 
and therefore her death, given the inconsistent evidence regarding 
whether breast cancer is caused by the mutation or not. Thus, in the 
minority of states that require a causal relationship between the 
misrepresentation and the death, insurers may have a difficult time 
establishing a clear causation, even in cases where mutations in a 
single gene cause a disease. 
B. Actuarial Justification 
In most states, misrepresentation is material if, had it been known 
at the time of the underwriting, it would have caused the insurer to 
alter the assessment of risk.112 If the information would statistically 
affect risk significantly, and therefore alter underwriting, it is 
material. Arguably, the reverse should also be true: If a potential risk 
factor fails to meet the standards of underwriting, it cannot be 
material. 
Underwriting seeks to properly evaluate an applicant through 
accurate risk evaluation and categorization.113 Underwriters are 
required to choose risk categories that are linked to statistically likely 
and anticipated outcomes.114 “A relationship between a risk 
 
110. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Kocarnik & Stephanie M. Fullerton, Returning 
Pleiotropic Results from Genetic Testing to Patients and Research 
Participants, 311 JAMA 795 (2014). 
111. Wendy Kohlmann & Stephen B. Gruber, Lynch Syndrome, in 
GENEREVIEWS™ (Roberta A. Pagon et al. eds., 2014), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1211/. 
112. Ingram, supra note 86, at 110. 
113. See Stone, supra note 35, at 296. 
114. The Bazelon Center for Mental Health created a guide about risk 
classification in health and disability insurance. In this guide, they 
articulate several types of evaluative questions that insurers and those 
assessing the risk classification practices of the companies can consider 
to determine the fairness of actuarial determinations. “(a) Are the 
elements of the classification (e.g. medical condition, current treatments, 
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characteristic and an expected outcome, such as cost, is demonstrated 
if it can be shown that the variation in actual or reasonably 
anticipated experience correlates to the risk characteristic.”115 If the 
 
history of prior treatment) sufficiently correlated with the relevant 
outcome measure (e.g. an elevated level of cost) for all members of the 
defined policyholder class? And, to what should costs be compared? 
What is the appropriate benchmark comparison group or class?; (b) Is 
any element of the classification superfluous? Does each element make a 
statistically significant contribution to the outcome?; (c) Is the 
correlation between classification and the outcome (cost) bona fide? Is it 
clear that the correlation is not an artifact of one or more unmeasured 
variables (i.e. statistically spurious)?; (d) Is it clear that an otherwise 
lawful classification is not operating as a surrogate for one which is 
impermissible, e.g. medical condition as a surrogate for race?; (e) Are 
the data used to establish the correlation between classification and 
outcome drawn from actuarial cost experience of people who are 
substantially similar to those subject to the classification?; (f) Are the 
data sufficient to ensure a high degree of accuracy (actuarial 
credibility)?; (g) Are members of the class similar and consistent with 
one another in terms of risk profiles (“homogeneity”)?. Do members of 
one class have risk/cost profiles which are distinct from members of 
other classes (“separation”)?; (h) Where the insurer’s underwriting 
action is to decline a category of risks outright, can the insurer 
demonstrate that excess costs are not transitory and cannot be 
mitigated with less severe underwriting actions, e.g. a time-limited 
exclusionary rider?” Larry Kirsch, Assessing the Actuarial Basis for 
Health-Related Underwriting in Medical and Disability Insurance, 
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L. (2005), 
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=R9YQS4gzb44%3D&
tabid=345. These probing questions illustrate the depths of 
interrogation that advocates can use to challenge initial actuarial 
determinations. Considering these questions in the context of genetic 
information highlights areas where actuarial justification may fall flat. 
For example, genetic information could easily be used as a surrogate for 
an impermissible classification such as race – as highlighted in question 
(d). Additionally, genetic research can suffer from lack of minority 
participants and there may be concerns as to the homogeneity of risk 
profiles, as discussed in question (g). 
115. ACTUARIAL STANDARDS BOARD, Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP) 
No. 12: Risk Classification (for All Practice Areas), 3 (2005), 
http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.org/pdf/asops/asop012_101.pdf. 
Actuarial justification does not require insurers to establish causation, 
only correlation; however, this correlation must be sufficient enough 
statistically. It is important to remember that actuarial fairness does not 
guarantee social fairness. See infra Section IV. “In some cases, the use of 
a risk characteristic that exhibits a strong correlation to the outcomes of 
a covered risk, but for which no cause-and-effect explanation has been 
established, may be unfavorably received by the public.” AM. ACADEMY 
OF ACTUARIES: RISK CLASSIFICATION WORK GROUP, On Risk 
Classification: A Public Policy Monograph 50 (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/finreport/RCWG_RiskMonograph_Nov20
11.pdf. 
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underwriting process imposes a risk classification that is not 
appropriately tied to the person’s actual risk, it will violate principles 
of actuarial justification. For example, in Chabner v. United of 
Omaha Life Insurance, the Ninth Circuit held that the insurer’s 
assignment of a 96.5% premium increase, generally given to those 
with a nine to eleven year life expectancy decrease, was not 
actuarially sound for an individual whose diagnosis of 
fascioscapulohumeral muscular dystrophy was only associated with a 
four year decrease in life expectancy.116 
While genetic data provides some information regarding the risk 
profile of an applicant, over-reliance on the predictive value of genetic 
tests could actually threaten actuarial fairness.117 Such overzealous 
interpretation of genetic information is not without precedence: there 
is evidence that, in the past, insurance companies have overestimated 
the predictive value of genetic information.118 However, there are 
currently relatively few conditions for which a genetic test can 
definitively or accurately predict substantial increased risk of 
disease.119 Even among these conditions, the time of onset and the 
severity of symptoms are largely unpredictable. 
Several issues make precise risk prediction difficult. First, most 
common conditions and diseases, such as heart disease, diabetes, and 
cancer, are multifactorial, meaning that they are suspected to be 
caused by interactions between multiple genes and largely unknown 
environmental factors. Conditions caused by a mutation in a single 
gene are relatively rare. In those that are caused by mutations in a 
single gene, such as BRCA-related cancer, Huntington’s disease, or 
cystic fibrosis, validated pathogenic mutations have a much higher 
predictive value than the variants associate with multifactorial 
conditions.120 “Because multifactorial diseases are caused by a complex 
interplay of many genetic and non-genetic factors, the predictive 
 
116. Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1045-46, 1052 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
117. Mittra, supra note 16, at 362. 
118. See Holmes, supra note 26, at 515 (stating that “unfair genetic 
discrimination in insuring can occur simply because of insurer ignorance 
in granting statistical validity to genomic data that is not sufficiently 
precise for that purpose.”); see also Ostrer et al., supra note 70, at 571 
(citing evidence that insurance companies have used genetic test results 
that do not affect morbidity or mortality, such as being a carrier for 
sickle cell, as a basis of denial). 
119. RADETZKI ET AL., supra note 21, at 44; Ostrer et al., supra note 72, at 
565, 571. 
120. Cf. Joly et al., supra note 31, at 576 (noting that currently, most of the 
data from whole genome or exome sequencing is “largely 
indecipherable”). 
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value of testing for a single genetic variant is limited. The disease risk 
in carriers of the risk variant is only slightly higher than that in non-
carriers.”121 Since these variants do not provide much predictive value 
or may be associated with only very slight increases or decreases in 
risk, their use by life insurance companies may not meet standards of 
actuarial fairness.122 
Second, genetic mutations vary in the degree to which they cause 
symptoms to be apparent. “Penetrance” is the term used for the 
likelihood that a person with a genetic variant will develop the 
condition. Very few conditions, with the notable exception of 
Huntington’s disease, have 100% penetrance.123 Instead, a mutation in 
a gene usually indicates that an individual has an increased chance of 
developing the disease.124 These penetrance rates range from very 
high, such as a 70% chance of developing kidney cancer with the gene 
for Von Hippel-Lindau disease (VHL), to very low, such as less than a 
10% chance of developing cirrhosis in those who have both copies of a 
mutation in the gene for hemochromatosis (HFE).125 Even if an 
individual develops symptoms, there is often a broad range of 
manifestations. Identifying a causative mutation through a genetic 
test result, however, usually cannot provide accurate predictive 
information about how severe the condition will be if it ever 
develops.126 Therefore, the predictive value of genetic testing depends, 
 
121. A. Cecile J.W. Janssens & Muin J. Khoury, Predictive Value of Testing 
for Multiple Genetic Variants in Multifactorial Diseases: Implications 
for the Discourse on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues, 3 ITALIAN J. OF 
PUB. HEALTH 35, 36 (2006). 
122. Agnus S. Macdonald, Genetics and Health Costs: Some Actuarial 
Models, 1 LAW, PROBABILITY AND RISK 97, 105 (2002). 
123. Simon C. Warby et al., Huntington Disease, in GENEREVIEWS™ 
(2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1305/. 
124. Huntington’s disease is one of the rare conditions that is both caused by 
one gene and is 100% penetrant. It is also a common example that is 
used when discussing ethical and legal issues surrounding genetic testing 
– including the use of genetics in life insurance. However, Huntington’s 
disease is an anomaly and very few other genetic conditions are as 
predictive of risk. Janssens & Khoury, supra note 121, at 36. More 
discussion is needed surrounding the complexities of the use of genetic 
information in life insurance for those conditions that have lower 
predictive value. 
125. See generally Carlijn Frantzen et al., Von Hippel-Lindau Disease, in 
GENEREVIEWS™ (Roberta A. Pagon, et al. eds., 2012); Kris V. 
Knowdley et al., HFE-Associated Hereditary Hemochromatosis, in 
GENEREVIEWS™ (Roberta A. Pagon, et al. eds., 2012), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1440/?report=classic. 
126. James P. Evans et al., The Complexities of Predictive Genetic Testing, 
322 BMJ 1052, 1053 (2001). 
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not only upon the established association between a gene mutation 
and a disease, but also upon the likelihood that someone with that 
mutation will actually develop symptoms. 
Third, even if a mutation of a genetic variant is associated with 
an increased risk of disease, it may not be associated with an 
increased risk of death.127 This is particularly true in cases where the 
genetic condition can be prevented or mitigated through early 
intervention. For example, mutations in the BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 
genes are associated with a 40-80% increased risk of breast cancer and 
an 11-40% increased risk of ovarian cancer.128 However, there are 
effective preventive measures that women with BRCA mutations can 
take, such as increased screenings or prophylactic surgeries to remove 
her breasts or ovaries.129 For example, a recent study found that 
preventive removal of ovaries lowers the rate of death for women with 
BRCA mutations.130 If a woman who has undergone these preventive 
measures applies for life insurance, the insurer should take into 
consideration this adjustment to the risk.131 
Finally, the knowledge base of associations between genetic 
 
127. The actuarial justification for the use of genetic information in life 
insurance may be very different than the actuarial justification for the 
use in other insurances, such as long-term care insurance and disability 
insurance. The likelihood that an individual will develop a disease may 
be more closely associated with the risk of requiring time off from work 
or a stay in a long-term care facility, than the risk of death. However, 
the considerations of risk-lowering preventive measures will also come 
into play in these other insurance realms. “Although some morbidity 
data have been developed for these predisposing mutations, it is still too 
early to develop any meaningful mortality data.” Rothstein, supra note 
20, at 200; see also Macdonald, supra note 122, at 114 (actuarialy 
analyzing the effects of genetic information in life insurance and 
mentioning how this analysis may be different in other insurance 
realms). 
128. NANCIE PETRUCELLI ET AL., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Hereditary Breast and 
Ovarian Cancer, in GENEREVIEWS™ 1, 3 (Roberta A. Pagon, et al. eds., 
1993), available at  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK1247/ 
?report=printable. 
129. Id. at 19-20, 22; Susan M. Domchek et al., Association of Risk-Reducing 
Surgery in BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutation Carriers with Cancer Risk and 
Mortality, 304 JAMA 967, 969 (2010). 
130. Domchek et al., supra note 129, at 972. 
131. See, e.g., Louise A. Keogh & Margaret F.A. Otlowski, Life Insurance 
and Genetic Test Results: A Mutation Carrier’s Fight to Achieve Full 
Cover, 199 MED. J. AUSTL. 363, 365 (2013) (discussing a case in 
Australia where a man successfully argued that his Lynch Syndrome was 
not actuarially tied to risk of death due to the preventive measures he 
could take to minimize his chances of developing colon cancer). 
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variants and disease is constantly changing.132 Thus, genetic variants 
that are of unclear significance at the time of an application may later 
turn out to be predictive for a certain condition. This changing 
landscape raises complications for insurance risk classification, 
especially in circumstances of post-claims underwriting. Insurers and 
applicants should be bound to only consider the state of knowledge at 
the time of the application, but even in hindsight, this may be 
difficult. For example, in situations where there is evidence presented 
both for and against a proposition, like the breast cancer and Lynch 
Syndrome example133, both parties can contend that the state of 
knowledge at the time of the application favors their argument. 
In summary, most genetic information does not have strong 
predictive value due to the multitude of causes, both genetic and non-
genetic, of most diseases, varying degrees to which a specific mutation 
will lead to symptoms, and the availability of preventive steps 
individuals can take to minimize risk for certain genetic diseases.134 
Yet, the potential use of genetic information in life insurance 
underwriting remains a high concern of applicants and insurance 
companies alike. Applicants continue to harbor concerns both for the 
times when life insurers discriminate based on genetic mutations that 
have predictive value and for the times when insurers might 
overestimate risk based on genetic information. On the other hand, 
even if life insurers are not consistently using genetic information in 
underwriting, they desire to preserve their right to utilize genetic 
information for a time in the future when the predictive value may be 
more certain. 
C. Direct Questions on the Application 
As discussed above, life insurers are generally not asking about 
genetic information on initial applications. If an insurer does not 
request genetic information up front, but later seeks to rescind the 
contract, can they argue that non-disclosed, unasked for information 
is material? Or, from the individual’s perspective, should the 
applicant assume that the insurance company has asked for all 
information that it deems material to underwriting decisions? 
Fairness would argue for a requirement that insurance companies 
seek full and complete information during the application and 
underwriting process. There are countless environmental, behavioral, 
and medical risk factors that could contribute to an increased risk of 
 
132. Stefan Timmermans, Trust in Standards: Transitioning Clinical Exome 
Sequencing from Bench to Bedside, 45 SOC. STUD. SCI. 77, 81 (2015). 
133. See infra Section VII.A. 
134. See C.D. Daykin et al., Genetics and Insurance–Some Social Policy 
Issues, 9 BRIT. ACTUARIAL J. 787, 789 (2003). 
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early death. In reality, there is no way that an insurance company 
could create, or an individual could complete, an application that 
comprehensibly covered all possible material information. Therefore, 
both parties naturally draw a line of what they consider material. If 
an insurer were to ask a broad, catch-all question seeking information, 
the applicant may chose not to disclose that they carpool to work 
with a reckless driver, or that they use household cleaning products 
with high chemical content, or that they have a genetic variant 
associated with a slight chance of developing a disease, but they may 
choose to disclose intermittent lower back pain that they have been 
experiencing. Each of these truths may arguably slightly increase an 
individual’s risk of death or disease, but the applicant may only think 
of one or may feel that the others are not ‘material’ in their 
perspective. 
Allowing post-claims underwriting for information the insurance 
application never asked about creates an unfair system where insurers 
can require applicants to define for themselves what information is 
material, but where insurers are allowed to determine whether the 
applicant’s definition of material was sufficient years later, even after 
the individual has passed away. Life insurance is the business of 
taking on risk; however, under a system that does not require direct 
questions on applications, the individuals carry the burden of risk 
rather than the companies. If they did not properly guess whether 
they had risk factors that the insurer would deem as material other 
than the ones asked about on the application, the individual risks 
losing the insurance. Life insurers are in the best position to 
determine, prior to the application and policy, what is material to the 
risk and should be required to ask all relevant information in the 
application.135 
Historically, contracts in general and insurance policies in 
particular required parties to conduct themselves with uberrimae 
 
135. See, e.g., Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Quisset Properties, Inc., 866 
N.E.2d 966, 973 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (finding that the insurers 
knowledge and experience counsels the court to require insurers to 
identify and ask for all information material to underwriting and noting 
that “imposing the burden of inquiry on the insurer poses no undue 
burden and reduces, if not eliminates, the difficult determination of 
what is, or is not, material to the risk of loss from the perspective of an 
insurer.”); Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 
(1928) (holding that “information not asked for is deemed immaterial”); 
see also Fred N. Six & Todd N. Thompson, Misrepresentation in the 
Application for Life Insurance: Lies in the Eyes of the Beholder, 52 INS. 
COUNSEL J. 282, 290 (1985) (noting that an insurance company “retains 
the right to define, by its underwriting standards, what is material to 
the risk, but it must make a reasonable effort to solicit appropriate 
information from its insured or be barred from defending on the ground 
of the insured’s failure to provide that information.”). 
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fidei, or utmost good faith.136 This would require the applicant to 
disclose all conditions that she has knowledge of at the time of the 
application that would affect her risk.137 However, since this common 
law standard developed, the life insurance industry has begun 
requiring individuals to apply for policies using pre-formed application 
questions. This rise in required application questions softened the 
strict requirements of uberrimae fidei, “since information not asked 
for is presumably deemed immaterial.”138 
For example, in Southard v. Occidental Life Insurance Company 
of California, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a man made 
no material misrepresentation on his group life insurance application 
when he did not disclose his quadriplegia.139 The court found that the 
insurance company had not directly asked about any physical 
impairment or whether he had recently received medical advice.140 
“The insured is not obligated to volunteer statements of every 
circumstance which anybody may subsequently deem important as 
affecting the risk upon his life, for it is requisite only that he answer 
all questions truly, make no untrue statements, and submit himself to 
a full examination.”141 The Southard case is notable because the 
insured was an insurance agent. Yet, even though he was an expert in 
the field who knew that an insurance company might consider 
quadriplegia a material risk, he was still not required to disclose it 
because the insurer had not asked a relevant question.142 Legal 
precedence generally establishes that applicants are not required to 
provide information beyond what is asked on the application, even if 
material to risk and underwriting. 
 
136. Stipcich at 316. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 316-17 (noting, however, that applicants are still required to have 
the utmost good faith in correcting information if medical changes alter 
the original question answers between the time of application and the 
delivery of the policy); William Penn Life Ins. Co. v. Sands, 912 F.2d 
1359, 1362 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that an insurer can only rescind a 
policy based on misrepresentations or nondisclosures made in response 
to an insurer request).  
139. Southard v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 142 N.W.2d 844 (Wis. 
1966). 
140. Id. at 846-47. 
141. Id. at 848 (citing 9 Couch on Insurance (2d), p. 376, sec. 38:58). 
142. Id. at 847; cf. Holmes, supra note 27, at n. 98 (noting that failure to 
disclose unasked for information may be considered bad faith and citing 
WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 372 (3d ed. 
1951)). 
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D. Latency 
In states where materiality alone, not intent, can establish 
misrepresentation, rescission of policies is allowed even for applicants’ 
innocent mistakes. Taking this concept to the extreme, some courts 
have allowed insurers to rescind policies based on latent diseases—
conditions that the applicant had while applying, but was unaware of 
and had never been diagnosed with. For example, in Davis v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia granted summary judgment to a life insurer that denied a 
claim due the applicant’s failure to disclose acute lymphocytic 
leukemia.143 The applicant’s condition, however, was not diagnosed 
until after the life insurance policy was in place.144 The court found 
that the fact that the disease was latent and undiagnosed at the time 
of the application was an insufficient defense for the applicant: The 
insurer established that the representation was untrue and was 
material, so the intent or knowledge of the applicant was not needed 
to satisfy the elements of misrepresentation.145 
Allowing rescission for non-disclosure of unknown and latent, but 
material, conditions is particularly problematic in the realm of genetic 
testing. For example, an insurer may argue that a certain genetic 
predisposition is material and that it was present, albeit latently, in 
the individual at the time of the application. If successful in this 
argument, the insurer could rescind an insurance policy based on the 
non-disclosure of a genetic predisposition that the applicant never got 
tested for—even a genetic predisposition for which the applicant did 
not know they were at risk.  
For example, in Georgia, where the Davis case occurred, life 
insurance companies are explicitly exempted from rules regarding the 
use of genetic information in insurance.146 Therefore, under current 
law, a life insurance company in Georgia could arguably perform 
genetic testing on a blood sample obtained from an applicant without 
his or her knowledge or informed consent. If the insurer finds a 
genetic variant during this sequencing that qualifies as material, it 
could then potentially rescind the policy for failure to disclose a 
latent, but material, condition. 
 
143. Davis v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 413 S.E.2d 224, 226 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. (noting that “[t]his is true although the applicant may have acted in 
good faith, not knowing that a representation is untrue.”) 
146. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-7 (West 1995). 
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E. Materiality Revisited 
If an insurance company can prove that undisclosed genetic 
information is material, it has established one of the major elements 
of a claim for rescission based on misrepresentation. In the majority of 
jurisdictions, the insurance company need not prove that the 
information caused the death of the insured, only that it would have 
affected underwriting decisions. These companies, however, generally 
must solicit information on the initial application in order for it to be 
considered material: they are barred from claiming that an insured 
failed to offer up material information that was unasked for on the 
application. The main question that remains untested is whether a 
genetic variant or condition is sufficiently correlated to risk to 
actuarially support an insurance company’s claim of materiality to 
underwriting. Given the vast array of genetic variants and the wide 
scope of understanding and predictive value for each of these variants, 
the issues of materiality are likely to apply differently to different 
conditions and to different variants within each condition.147 
Additionally, as our knowledge of the predictive value of genetic 
information, as well as the preventive measures available, grows, the 
materiality of information will shift over time.148 
VIII. Intent 
The second common element often needed to establish a case of 
 
147. See, e.g., Ostrer et al., supra note 72, at 570 (“[s]ince several intervening 
steps may be required in order for disease to develop, the predictive 
value of a positive test result may be less than that used for previous 
forms of genetic screening. Indeed, the predictive value of a a positive 
test result may differ for each ofthe disease processes that is associated 
with a given mutation. The age at onset of disease may influence the 
utility of predictive testing for claims experience, since some diseases 
may occur at a time late in life, when life insurance companies would 
ordinarily expect to have an increased claim exposure regardless of test 
results.”) 
148. Since misrepresentation cases, especially those involving post-claims 
underwriting, are likely to occur years, or even decades, after the initial 
application, it is important that courts analyze the issues of materiality 
from the viewpoint of the time that the alleged misrepresentation was 
made. Thus, if knowledge of the predictive value of a genetic variant 
increases over time, the materiality determination should not take into 
account this improved (or lowered) correlation. Rather, the court must 
examine whether, given the knowledge base at the time of the 
application, the specific genetic condition or variant would have been 
material to the underwriting. See Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 
582 A.2d 530, 541 (N.J. 1990) (“Materiality should be judged as of the 
time when the misrepresentation is made. In hindsight, the significance 
of an untruth may turn out to be greater or less than expected.”). 
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misrepresentation is intent to deceive. In states that have this 
requirement, the insurer must prove, not just that there was a false 
statement or an omission on an insurance application, but that the 
applicant made this representation or omission knowingly, with the 
intent to deceive the insurer. In other words, the insurer must show 
that it was not an innocent misrepresentation. 
A. Question of Fact 
Whether or not an individual had intent to deceive when making 
a misrepresentation is a very difficult element to prove. It is 
challenging to definitely determine what someone was thinking when 
he or she completed the insurance application. This is especially 
complicated in post-claims cases since the applicant is now deceased 
and cannot testify as to their state of mind or understanding of the 
question. The determination of intent is usually a fact specific inquiry 
that examines the totality of the circumstances in each individual 
case. For this reason, courts have often held that issues of intent are 
questions of fact and often survive summary judgment.149 
Triers of fact must examine all facts within the case to determine 
whether the applicant had the intent to deceive. This usually involves 
a determination of whether the applicant had knowledge of the 
information. Additionally, sometimes the insurer must show whether 
the applicant understood the non-disclosed information’s 
materiality.150 For example, in Louisiana, 
[t]he intent to deceive must be determined from the attending 
circumstances which indicate the insured’s knowledge of the 
falsity of the representations made in the application and his 
recognition of the materiality thereof, or from circumstances 
which create a reasonable assumption that the insured 
recognized the materiality of the misrepresentations.151 
 
149. See, e.g., Cutter & Buck, Inc. v. Genesis Ins. Co., 306 F.Supp.2d 988, 
1004 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (noting that intent to deceive is a question of 
fact); see also Rowley v. USAA Life Ins. Co., 670 F.Supp.2d 1199, 1203 
(W.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that the question of intent raises issues for 
the jury); see also Smith v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 6162757, at 
*3 (E.D. La. 2012) (noting that the intent to deceive test relies on 
circumstantial evidence and is therefore not general established in the 
summary judgment stage (citing Guillory v. Domtar Indus. Inc. v. John 
Deere Co., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir.1996))). 
150. See, e.g., Rowley, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1202-03 (finding that knowlege of a 
false statement raises a presumption of intent to decieve unless the 
plaintiff can present evidence to overcome this presumption). 
151. Watson v. Life Ins. Co. of Louisiana, 335 So. 2d 518, 521 (La. Ct. App. 
1976) (citations omitted). 
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Thus, determination of whether an individual with a genetic 
predisposition had the intent to deceive must be approached from 
specific examination of the totality of the circumstances. For example, 
in Rowley v. USAA Life Insurance Company, the court denied the 
insurers motion for summary judgment because there were sufficient 
questions of fact for a jury to decide whether the plaintiff intended to 
deceive the insurer.152 This case illustrates how the totality of the 
circumstances can help to provide evidence as to the applicant’s state 
of mind. The insurer argued that the plaintiff had, among other 
things, failed to disclose serious neck and back conditions and a 
history of drug use. Although the plaintiff had failed to disclose all 
information about his neck and back conditions on one application, 
the court noted that in previous applications, the plaintiff had 
disclosed this information to the same insurance company; therefore, a 
reasonable juror could find no intent to deceive.153 Similarly, the 
application asked whether the individual had ever used narcotics, 
marijuana, and other types of drugs, “unless on the advice of a 
physician.”154 Although the plaintiff failed to disclose his history of 
methadone and marijuana use, there was evidence that these drugs 
were taken on the advice of his doctor.155 Thus, although on the face 
of the application it appears that the plaintiff may have lied or 
intentionally failed to disclose information in his responses, the 
entirety of the circumstances provide evidence that he may not have 
had the intent to deceive.  
B. Materiality and Intent Revisited 
Whether an insurer is required to prove both materiality and 
intent in order to rescind an insurance policy depends upon both the 
state and whether the attempted rescission is occurring after the 
incontestability period. In most states, prior to the incontestability 
period, a rescission can occur after a showing of either materiality or 
intent: After the incontestability period in most states, the insurer 
must prove both materiality and intent. A minority of states allow for 
rescission at anytime, even after the two-year contestability window, 
with only a showing of materiality. Additionally, in several states, an 
insurance company can rescind a policy during the incontestability 
period even when the individual did not know about the condition in 
question. 
Whether a non-disclosed fact is material depends upon whether it 
 
152. Rowley, 670 F.Supp.2d at 1204. 
153. Id. at 1203-04. 
154. Id. at 1201. 
155. Id. at 1206. 
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would have altered the insurers underwriting decision and whether it 
was asked on the initial insurance application. Additionally, the 
intent element often depends on the application questions since the 
type of question asked and the answer given can illustrate to the trier 
of fact the state of mind of the applicant. The next section will 
highlight different types of questions about genetic information that 
may be asked on an insurance application and explore how such 
questions could affect the determination of materiality and intent.  
IX. Genetics, Insurance Applications, and Interpreting 
Questions 
Many commentators claim that life insurance applicants are 
obligated to disclose to the company any known genetic risk and that 
they are committing fraud if they fail to disclose such information.156 
However, as discussed above, applicants generally have no duty to 
disclose information that is not asked for on an insurance application. 
On the other hand, the insurance company is not required to ask for 
such information explicitly: general questions can, in some 
circumstances, be interpreted as seeking information about genetic 
information.157 There has been little discussion examining how legal 
standards of fraud and misrepresentation may actually apply in this 
area. The current policy landscape provides little guidance to 
individuals who desire to apply for life insurance and creates a system 
that may entrap well-meaning individuals into fraudulent behavior 
despite their best efforts to truthfully apply for insurance. 
A broad variety of questions can implicate answers related to 
genetic information, ranging from seemingly explicit requests for 
genetic information to expansive questions about health. For each of 
these question categories, there are myriad of options for phrasing and 
subtlety of wording that an insurer may choose. These examples are 
used as illustrations to highlight potential complications with 
interpretation and the difficulty an applicant with a genetic 
predisposition may have navigating the application. 
A. The ‘Direct’ Question 
Have you ever received a genetic test result that indicates an 
increased risk of future disease? 
Case law makes clear that a knowing lie in response to a direct 
question on an application will likely satisfy both the materiality and 
intent elements and would thus be considered a fraudulent 
 
156. See supra Section I. 
157. See infra Section IX.B. 
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misrepresentation. Therefore, if an individual has had testing that 
revealed a pathologic mutation and fails to disclose this, it would 
likely be considered fraud.158 For example, if Timothy from the 
introduction example failed to disclose his recent Lynch Syndrome 
genetic testing result, the insurer could likely rescind the policy. 
However, even a direct question about genetic testing results may be 
ambiguous as the results of genetic testing may show variants with 
little or no evidence of pathogenicity. 
1. Variants of uncertain significance (VUS) 
A variant of uncertain significance (VUS), sometimes called a 
variant of unknown significance, is a variant in a gene for which 
pathogenic mutations have been identified that cause a disease, but 
for which there is not enough evidence to determine whether this 
particular variant is pathogenic or not.159 Therefore, physicians and 
the individual tested will not know the implication of the results until 
further genomic research finds enough evidence to re-categorize the 
variant as pathogenic or benign. Finding a variant that has unknown 
clinical significance is not an uncommon result. For example, 
approximately one-third of BRCA1 variants identified by sequencing 
have uncertain clinical significance.160 If an individual has BRCA 
sequencing and a VUS is found, the answer to the question of whether 
they have ever received a genetic test result that indicated risk for 
future disease is quite literally “I’m not sure—and neither is the 
laboratory.” Therefore, if a question is specifically worded to only 
collect information about test results that are “positive” or indicate 
 
158. Holmes, supra note 27, at 541 (“If an applicant knows materially 
adverse genetic facts regarding the applicant’s foreseeable need for later 
medical treatment and care, and also knows that the insurer does not 
have equal access to these material genetic facts, then that applicant has 
a good faith obligation to disclose this information to protect the 
insurer’s solvency and to ensure equitable premiums.” Failure to do so is 
“tantamount to fraud.”); Meyer, supra note 66, at 30. 
159. See, e.g., Frederick E. Dewey et al., Clinical Interpretation and 
Implications of Whole-Genome Sequencing, 311 JAMA 1035, 1038-39 
(2014); Sharon E. Plon et al., Sequence Variant Classification and 
Reporting: Recommendations for Improving the Interpretation of 
Cancer Susceptibility Genetic Test Results, 29 HUMAN MUTATION 1282, 
1283 (2008); see also Sue Richards et al., Standards and Guidelines for 
the Interpretation of Sequence Variants: A Joint Consensus 
Recommendation of the American College of Medical Genetics and 
Genomics and the Association for Molecular Pathology, 17 GENETICS IN 
MED. 405 (2015) (describing types of variant classification, including 
VUS, in Mendelian conditions). 
160. Plon et al., supra note 159, at 1283 (noting that rates of VUS are even 
higher in understudied population). 
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increased risk, it may not be clear how an individual should answer if 
the genetic test result is clinically uncertain. 
Additionally, the categorization of genetic variants as pathogenic, 
uncertain, or benign requires human interpretation and at times 
various groups disagree as to the classification of the same variant.161 
Therefore, an individual could be told that she has a benign variant in 
a disease-associated gene, but another laboratory classifies the result 
as a VUS. In this case, even if an insurance question asked whether 
the person ever had a positive or VUS test result, the applicant could 
be seen as lying if she said no because, unbeknownst to her, at least 
one laboratory defined the significance of the variant differently than 
the laboratory that happened to perform her test. 
Furthermore, because the technology is rapidly changing, the 
databases that help laboratories and physicians to categorize the 
pathogenicity of a variant may be updated, even week-to-week.162 
Therefore, a variant classification received by an applicant one week 
could be invalid the next due to advances and newly published studies 
in genomics. An applicant may answer a question to the best of their 
knowledge, but an insurer may discover that the clinical 
interpretation of the applicant’s specific variant is now different. 
2. Entity performing testing 
In addition to the type of result that a person receives, the source 
of where the individual received test results may arguably affect 
relevance to answers. Genetic testing performed in a clinical setting is 
most likely to be relevant to the life insurance context; however, 
individuals may have access to genetic information through direct-to-
consumer (DTC) genetic testing or research testing. It is unclear 
whether results from these contexts should be collected or used by 
insurers, particularly because the standards of analytic validity—that 
is, how well the test truly measures the variants it reports—vary in 
these arenas.163 
For example, research laboratories performing genomic sequencing 
are not held to the same standards of analytic or clinical validity as 
that of a clinical laboratory.164 Therefore, if an individual receives 
 
161. Dewey et al., supra note 159, at 1039 (finding varying levels of 
“concordance” in classification depending upon the type of variant). 
162. See Timmermans, supra note 132, at 89. 
163. See SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. OF GENETIC TESTING, ENHANCING 
THE OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SACGT 
(2000), http://osp.od.nih.gov/sites/default/files/oversight_report.pdf 
(defining analytic validity as how well a test measures what it is 
intended to measure). 
164. Joly et al., supra note 31, at 576-77 (“[G]enomic results obtained in the 
research context may not meet scientific and medical requirements (e.g. 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Tantamount to Fraud?: Exploring Non-Disclosure of Genetic Information 
in Life Insurance Applications as Ground for Policy Rescission 
298 
genetic information from a research laboratory, there may be 
arguments that this is less material to an insurer due to a greater 
degree of uncertainty as to their validity. Research that has recently 
been performed in the U.S. likely does not implicate concerns of 
validity since the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) now 
requires that most genetic research results returned to participants be 
first confirmed in a laboratory meeting clinical requirements.165 
However, if an applicant has research results that were not confirmed 
in a CLIA-compliant laboratory or from an international laboratory, 
it may not be fair for life insurers to consider such results as valid. 
For this reason, it is also unclear what duties individuals have to 
disclose results collected in a research study when asked generally 
about genetic tests. 
Similar arguments and concerns surround DTC genetic testing 
results. Recently, due to concerns of the scientific validity and 
overreaching medical claims, the FDA sent a cease-and-desist letter to 
23andMe to discontinue DTC testing.166 The FDA has the authority 
to regulate medical devices intended for use in disease diagnosis or 
prevention.167 Although the FDA has not historically regulated genetic 
testing products as devices, the 23andMe letter was a foray in this 
direction, with the FDA arguing that the company was marketing a 
medical device that did not have proper government approval.168 This 
letter overwhelmingly halted DTC testing across the U.S. However, 
many individuals have test results received prior to the FDA action—
results which raise questions about inclusion in life insurance decision-
making and applications similar to research results. 
 
analytical validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility/actionability) for 
use in the clinic”). Note: Joly et al. also argue that insurers should be 
restricted from asking about reserach results in applications in order to 
encourage individuals to participate in genomics research.). Cf. Ellen W. 
Clayton, Informed Consent and Genetic Research, in GENETIC SECRETS: 
PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 126, 
131 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (noting that, when answering 
insurance questions about genetic testing, it does not matter whether 
the testing was part of research or clinical care). 
165. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-578, 102 Stat. 2903 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C. § 263a); Wylie Burke et al., Return of Results: Ethical and 
Legal Distinctions Between Research and Clinical Care, 166C AM. J. 
MED. GENET. 105, 107 (2014). 
166. Patricia J. Zettler et al., 23andMe, the Food and Drug Administration, 
and the Future of Genetic Testing, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 493 
(2014). 
167. Id. at 493. 
168. Id. 
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3. Planning on getting a genetic testing 
Finally, if a life insurance application asks a direct question about 
genetic testing, there can still be complications regarding how to 
answer if an individual is considering getting genetic testing in the 
future. For example, if a question asks whether a person has received 
results, does Alfred need to respond that he is planning on getting 
tested? This similar type of debate occurred surrounding other 
medical conditions. Many insurers now ask, not only ‘have you ever 
been treated for a condition’, but also ‘have you been consulted about 
or been recommended to receive treatment for a condition.’ If the 
insurance company does not ask this broader question regarding 
genetic testing however, Alfred may answer the question honestly: 
that he has never received a genetic test result. Despite this honesty, 
the insurance company may try to argue later that this was a 
fraudulent answer because Alfred failed to disclose that he had sought 
genetic counseling and was planning on getting testing. Similarly, 
although a genetic counselor or a physician has not directly told 
Susan that she should get tested, her brother’s genetic counselor likely 
communicated the need for the siblings to get tested. Should Susan be 
required to disclose this despite her lack of intention to ever undergo 
testing herself? 
Predictive genetic testing and conditions that are known to have 
a genetic association are often spoke about in general culture at the 
gene level—such as a person who has received a “positive result for 
BRCA1” or someone “has APOE”, a gene associated with Alzheimer’s 
disease. In reality, information about risk comes from analysis at the 
variant level, which shows changes within a particular gene. 
Therefore, genetic risk should be described as “testing positive for a 
mutation in a BRCA 1 gene” or having “a variant in APOE 
associated with an increased risk of Alzheimer’s Disease.” 
Additionally, the variety of sequencing technologies and the human 
interpretation needed to analyze the output creates a system of 
varying results or interpretations of the same genome. Therefore, even 
if an insurance application directly asks about the results of a genetic 
test, there may be situations where applicants innocently misinterpret 
the question or that are sufficiently vague for the insurer to make 
post-claims arguments of fraud. 
B. The ‘Vague’ Question 
Insurers are not required to explicitly ask about every single risk 
factor on an application in order for non-disclosure to be fraudulent.169 
 
169. See W. Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Hoar, 505 F.Supp.2d 734, 744-45 (D. Colo. 
2007) (holding that a question on an application asking whether the 
applicant had ever engaged in scuba diving, auto racing, or “other 
hazardous avocation or hobby,” was unambiguously requesting 
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However, based on the contract principle that policy language should 
be interpreted against the drafter, any ambiguous questions on 
insurance applications should be interpreted in the light most 
favorable to the applicant.170 Thus, insurers should not be able to 
claim misrepresentation for an individual’s answer where there are 
multiple “rational interpretations” of the question.171 Under this 
rationale, some courts examine how a “reasonable applicant” would 
understand the question.172 For example, the court in Matlock v. 
Texas Life Insurance Company reviewed a motion for summary 
judgment regarding a rescinded life insurance policy.173 The 
application asked whether the individual had ever “received treatment 
or care in a hospital… within the past 6 months” and, despite having 
gone to a hospital for CT scans and blood work, the applicant 
answered “no.”174 The plaintiff argued that the phrase “treatment or 
care” was ambiguous and that the applicant could reasonably 
interpret the question to not include routine check-up procedures such 
as CT scans and blood work. When examining this issue in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, the court agreed, found the language 
ambiguous, and denied the motion for summary judgment on this 
issue.175 There are many situations where application questions can be 
ambiguous, especially in light of genetic information. The rest of this 
section will explore three common types of questions included on life 
insurance applications that could potentially be interpreted as 
requesting information about genetic information to highlight ways 
 
information about activities such as heli-skiing); 6 Couch on Insurance § 
81:42 (3d. ed., rev. 2012). 
170. See Vella v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the U.S., 887 F. 2d 388, 
392 (2d Cir. 1989) (explaining that the questions must be so plain and 
intelligible that any applicant can readily comprehend them. If any 
ambiguity exists, the construction will obtain most favorable to the 
insured) (citations omitted); see also Fanger v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. 
of N.Y., 709 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (applying this 
principle to the life insurance context). 
171. See, e.g., Hingham Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mercurio, 878 N.E.2d 946, 949 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (“Where a question on an application lends itself 
to more than one reasonable interpretation, an honest answer to one of 
those reasonable interpretations cannot be labeled a 
misrepresentation.”); see also Gary Schuman, Health and Life Insurance 
Applications: Their Role in the Claims Review Process, 62 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 225, 235 (1995). 
172. Six & Thompson, supra note 135, at 290. 
173. Matlock v. Tex. Life Ins. Co., 404 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1309 (W.D. Okla. 
2005). 
174. Id. at 1310-11. 
175. Id. at 1312. 
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that insurers may attempt to argue misrepresentation. 
1. Questions about diseases 
Have you ever received advice, been diagnosed with, or treated 
for any disease of the lungs or respiratory system, diabetes, 
cancer, heart disease, or any other serious illness? 
Many insurance applications will include specific questions about 
past or current incidences of disease. These may be a series of longer 
questions that enumerate examples of the types of diseases in question 
or be a broader question such as the fictitious example above. For 
illustrative purposes, the salient part of the inquiry is that the 
question refers specifically to disease of a particular kind—not to a 
predisposition to a disease. 
As discussed above, there is no way for a life insurance 
application to be written in such a way that anticipates and directly 
inquires about all possible material information. It is common to see 
questions such as the example above that list several illustrative 
examples and elicit specific answers to these conditions and others like 
them. However, the question must “fetch the answer” and the 
enumerated list must reasonably lead the applicant to understand 
what additional activities or conditions should be considered in the 
list.176 For example, in Fanger v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company, 
the court held that the question asking about whether the applicant 
had been treated for, “any other disorder, injury, or impairment,” was 
not clearly eliciting information about mental health conditions since 
it followed ten questions regarding physical disorders.177 In contrast, 
the court in West Coast Life Insurance Company v. Hoar found that 
the application was clearly soliciting information about heli-skiing 
because “other hazardous avocation or hobby” followed a list of other 
similar activities such as parachuting, skydiving, and hang gliding.178 
Does a list of illnesses and conditions “fetch the answer” of a 
genetic predisposition to one of the enumerated illnesses or to another 
condition?  If Timothy, the brother who has been told he has the 
familial pathogenic Lynch Syndrome mutation, sees the above 
question on a life insurance application, how might he answer, and 
how might an insurance company view his answer? Timothy may 
reasonably interpret this question to be seeking information only 
 
176. Southard v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 142 N.W.2d at 847 (finding 
that an insurer cannot “inquire about a few illnesses and expect a 
complete medical history in response”). 
177. Fanger v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 273 A.D.2d 438, 709 
N.Y.S.2d 622 (2000). 
178. W. Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Hoar, 505 F.Supp.2d 734, 745 (D. Colo. 2007). 
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about symptoms, diagnosis, and manifested diseases, not about 
genetic predispositions to disease. Since he has tested positive for the 
Lynch Syndrome mutation, but has never developed colon cancer or 
other symptoms, he may reasonably respond ‘no’ to the question. The 
insurance company, on the other hand, may argue that Timothy has 
received advice regarding cancer when he visited a genetic counselor 
and underwent testing to determine his personal risk, that he has 
been diagnosed with Lynch Syndrome, and that since Timothy is 
undergoing the medically recommended annual colonoscopies in his 
30’s—younger than recommended for the general population—that he 
is “in treatment” for this condition. In a post-claims underwriting 
argument, the insurer could try to claim that Timothy fraudulently 
made a material misrepresentation since he knew of his test results, 
failed to indicate his predisposition to Lynch Syndrome in response to 
this question, and that information would have affected their 
underwriting decision. 
This is essentially what occurred in case in Canada in 1990. In 
Annick Audet c. L’industrielle-alliance, the Quebec Superior Court 
ruled in favor of a life insurance company and found that an 
insurance applicant had withheld genetic information when, in 
response to the question, “Do you have any anomalies?”, he answered 
“no.”179 The applicant had the genetic disease myotonic muscular 
dystrophy, although he had no symptoms of the condition at the time 
of the application.180 Myotonic muscular dystrophy type 1 (DM1) is 
the most common form of myotonic muscular dystrophy, a 
multisystem degenerative disorder of the muscle system, eye, heart, 
endocrine system, and central nervous system.181 It is caused by an 
expansion of a DNA segment within the DM1 gene. The length of the 
expansion is correlated with age of onset and severity of symptoms. 
The applicant presumably interpreted the question to be asking only 
about current symptoms, not about predispositions to them. The 
court, however, found this to be an unpersuasive argument and ruled 
for the insurer.182 
 
179. Bartha M. Knoppers & Yann Joly, Physicians, Genetics and Life 
Insurance, 170 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N J. 1421, 1422 (2004). Since this is 
an international case from Canada, the ruling of the court is not binding 
precedent and would not be applying the same elements of 
misrepresentation or fraud. It is, however, an illustration of how 
applicants, courts, and insurance companies may interpret different 
questions in the context of genetic information. 
180. Id. 
181. Thomas D. Bird, Myotonic Dystrophy Type 1, in GENEREVIEWS™ 
(Roberta A. Pagon, et al. eds., 2013). 
182. Knoppers & Joly, supra note 179, at 1422. This is a Quebec court case 
in French, so this relies on an English description of the case. The 
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The potential discrepancy in the interpretations in both the 
Timothy example and the Quebec case boils down to whether a 
genetic predisposition is considered a disease or illness, or whether it 
is instead considered asymptomatic information that does not rise to 
the level of a disease. Courts have long struggled with how to 
interpret the numerous words used to describe disease—such as 
illness, ailment, impairment, infirmity—in the context of insurance.183 
This debate is likely to continue within the realm of genetic 
information.184 There is conflicting precedent in the health insurance 
realm regarding whether a genetic predisposition absent symptoms is 
a condition or disease. For example, under GINA and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 
asymptomatic genetic information cannot be considered a pre-existing 
condition.185 However, since health insurance predominately covers 
treatment over prevention, several individuals have successfully 
argued that a genetic predisposition constitutes disease in order to get 
insurance coverage for the ‘treatment’ of the condition—such as a 
prophylactic mastectomy to prevent breast cancer for those with 
mutations in BRCA1 or BRCA2.186 Thus, because of the differences 
between health and life insurance, defining something as a medical 
condition can have vastly different consequences. Because there are 
protections in health insurance, defining genetic predispositions as a 
condition can help to get coverage for treatment, but this same 
definition can create confusion in life insurance applications. This is 
an area that provides opportunity for disagreement over 
 
individual had confirmed the diagnosis through genetic testing and 
through an electromyogram. 
183. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Innocent Misrepresentation of Health in 
Insurance Applications, 28 MINN. L. REV. 141, 144 (1943) (discussing 
the difficulties of determining what threshold information is required in 
response to inquiries about diseases, illnesses, ailments, infirmities, or 
injuries); White v. Amer. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 651 F.Supp.2d 530 
(S.D.W.V. 2009) (discussing possible interpretations of mental illness, 
mental disorder, and “other condition”); Yarnell v. Transamerica Life 
Ins. Co., 694 F.Supp.2d 857, 869-70 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (discussing 
whether alcoholism can be classified as an “illness, injury, or disease”) 
(citations ommitted); Bennett v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 776 N.E.2d 1264, 
1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (analyzing whether slurred speech and 
hearing loss constituted an “ailment”); Hyman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. 
Amer., 481 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973) (defining illness as “any appreciable 
disorder” under Florida law). 
184. See, e.g., Anya E.R. Prince & Benjamin E. Berkman, When Does an 
Illness Begin: Genetic Discrimination and Disease Manifestation, 40 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 655 (2012). 
185. 45 C.F.R. § 148.180(d) (2009). 
186. Katskee v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.2d 645 (Neb. 1994). 
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interpretation and thus leaves well-meaning applicants at risk for 
claims of misrepresentation. 
2. Licensed Medical Professionals 
Have you consulted with or been treated by a physician or 
licensed medical practitioner in the past year? 
In order to uncover information about previously undisclosed or 
unasked about conditions, life insurance applications often elicit 
general information as to whether an applicant has seen a physician 
or licensed medical professional.187 This type of question raises 
potential issues of ambiguity if, like Alfred and Timothy, the 
applicant has consulted a genetic counselor, and has not spoken to a 
physician about the genetic condition. There may be various 
reasonable interpretations of appropriate answers when an applicant 
has received treatment or advice from medical specialists, not 
physicians.188 For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan found that 
an insurance applicant did not make a misrepresentation when he 
failed to disclose visits to a chiropractor because a chiropractor was 
not considered a physician under Michigan law and the application 
language only included physicians.189 
Depending on how narrowly or broadly a question about medical 
professionals is worded, there may be ambiguity as to whether the 
question was seeking information regarding a consultation with a 
genetic counselor. For example, if the question only asks about 
physicians, an applicant could reasonably omit information about 
consultations with a genetic counselor. In contrast, if a question asks 
more broadly about visits to medical professionals, this could more 
reasonably be interpreted as inclusive of genetics counselors. 
An interesting context could arise if a question asked specifically 
about “licensed medical professionals.” Currently, only 18 states have 
licensing statutes for genetic counseling.190 In the other states, there is 
no licensing system for genetic counselors, or a system is in the 
 
187. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 49, at 487. 
188. See, e.g., Fanger v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 273 A.D.2d 438, 
438-39, 709 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623-24 (2000) (highlighting complications of 
whether a visit to a psychiatrist constituted a “health examination”); 
McCalla v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins., 14 F. App’x 840, 842, 845 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (noting that the applicant did not disclose numerous 
appointments for back treatment because he did not think that a 
chiropractor was a “real doctor”). 
189. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Modzelewski, 267 Mich. 293, 300 (1934). 
190. States Issuing Licenses for Genetic Counselors, NAT’L SOC. OF GENETIC 
COUNSELORS, http://nsgc.org/p/cm/ld/fid=19 (last updated February 
24, 2016). 
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process of being set up. Therefore, questions about licensed 
professionals, or even medical professionals more broadly, could raise 
ambiguity given the variable state licensing rules. 
3. Catch-all Good Health Questions 
Are you in good health? 
In an effort to streamline life insurance applications, some insurers 
ask few specific questions eliciting medical information, but instead 
ask a general ‘catch-all’ question inquiring whether the individual is in 
good or sound health. Predominately, courts have interpreted 
questions about ‘good health’ as calling for a subjective opinion on 
health, not a professional medical opinion.191 Due to the 
overwhelming, and somewhat ridiculous, interpretations that are 
possible if questions of good health are interpreted literally, courts 
must give applicants leeway in responding to these broad questions: 
“Good health” does not mean perfect health.192 For example, courts in 
Texas have defined good health as “a state of health free from any 
disease or condition that affects the general soundness or healthfulness 
of the system seriously, that is, that the insured be not afflicted with 
a disease or condition of a substantial nature which affects the 
insured’s general health or which materially increases the risk to be 
assumed by the insurer.”193 
Thus, an inquiry into whether an individual misrepresented their 
health in response to a ‘good health’ question should not explore the 
presence of a disease, but rather how the applicant’s daily life and 
activities may have been affected by any symptoms or presence of 
disease. For example, an individual can have conditions as serious as 
diabetes or hypertension, but still be considered in good health 
depending upon how the diseases affect the individual.194  
191. Schuman, supra note 171, at 235. 
192. See Prosser, supra note 183, at 144-45 (explaining the problems of a 
non-subjective standard of interpretation because “[t]aken quite literally, 
and with the strictest possible interpretation, the applicant’s assertions 
of good health in reply to such an array of questions would be falsified, 
and the policy for which he paid his money avoided, if at the time or for 
some years past he had had a headache, a toothache, a cold, a boil, a 
cut on his finger, or an attack of indigestion superimposed on a supper 
of lobster, dill pickles, rye whiskey and ice cream.”). 
193. Amer. Nat. Ins. Co. v. Navarrete, 758 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. App. 
1988). 
194. Simonson v. Michigan Life Ins. Co., 194 N.W.2d 446, 449 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1971) (“Many people can have diabetes and even hypertension and 
still be considered to be in ‘sound health’. Obviously, however, a man 
who has suffered a severe stroke will be much more affected by these 
conditions than the average person otherwise healthy.”). 
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Given that courts have interpreted questions about good health 
subjectively and based upon how the condition affects the individual, 
individuals with genetic predispositions can likely answer that they 
are in good health—absent symptoms from a different disease or 
condition. For example, it would be reasonable for Alfred, Timothy, 
and Susan to subjectively believe that they are in good health, since 
all are currently asymptomatic and only undergoing genetic testing to 
determine their individual risk. This could be true even if one finds a 
polyp during a routine colonoscopy. Subjectively, a person can 
reasonably consider himself in good health even if his increased 
colonoscopy screenings occasionally find a polyp that is effectively 
removed during the procedure. Although past court precedent 
indicates that individuals with genetic predispositions are unlikely to 
have made a misrepresentation by indicating that they are in good 
health, this catch-all question on the application does provide an 
insurer with the opportunity to claim grounds for rescission. 
4. Ambiguous Questions and Intent 
Vague or ambiguous questions on applications create a difficult 
situation requiring reconciliation of two standards: 1) the requirement 
to interpret questions in the light most favorable to the applicant, 
and 2) the general holding that individuals with knowledge of an 
omitted condition are more likely to have committed fraud. In many 
instances, an applicant may have knowledge of a genetic test result 
and indeed may even be actively thinking about whether a question is 
asking about it on the application—in part due to the hype of genetic 
information in life insurance. For example, if an insurer attempts 
rescission of a policy for Alfred, Timothy, or Susan after it is 
discovered that they have a family history of or have tested positive 
for a Lynch Syndrome mutation, a court may focus on the likely 
intent of the siblings since they had just learned of a possible familial 
mutation for Lynch Syndrome and, in Alfred’s case, had received a 
recommendation to secure insurance prior to testing. 
Some may argue that in order to avoid misrepresentation or 
fraud, the applicant should include genetic information in response to 
every question that might be eliciting such information. After all, if 
the information ends up not being material, the insurance company 
won’t use it, and if the information ends up being material, the 
individual has just avoided fraud and post-claims rescission. This 
argument, however, is problematic for two reasons. First, we do not 
hold other medical or socio-behavioral factors to this same standard. 
Individuals are not required to provide information beyond what is 
asked about in the application: There should be no reason to require 
individuals with genetic predispositions to be in a different situation. 
Second, this places the entire burden on individuals and the entire 
benefit on life insurers in a system that is already skewed towards 
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insurers. Insurers are in the best position to write questions that are 
unambiguous and that seek material information. Otherwise, since 
cases could potentially boil down to an individual’s state of mind 
when applying—a difficult standard to both prove and disprove—
well-meaning individuals may be held to have committed fraud based 
on hindsight. 
X. Conclusion 
Many commentators and insurance representatives stress that life 
insurance companies need to have all the information about an 
applicant’s health that the applicant has: asymmetry in information, 
they argue, will impact the business of insurance with dire 
consequences. However, in the case of genetic information, insurance 
companies are not broadly asking about such information in life 
insurance applications. Life insurance companies desire to streamline 
their application process to attract customers and to save money from 
lengthy application procedures. Through this process, insurers fail to 
ask questions about genetic information, even though the answers to 
these questions could change their ultimate insurance decision. This 
potentially creates a problematic situation where an application does 
not explicitly ask about genetic information, yet an applicant’s failure 
to disclose such information legally constitutes fraud or 
misrepresentation. 
Some have claimed that failure to disclose genetic information on 
an insurance application may constitute fraud or misrepresentation. 
However, if an insurance application does not ask for certain 
information, an applicant is under no duty to disclose such 
information. There is no reason why genetic information should be 
treated any differently. There will be those that commit fraud, 
whether it is someone purposefully hiding something from the 
company or a desperate individual with a terminal genetic condition 
trying to secure financial stability for his family. However, in the 
current legal landscape, given the complexities of genetic information 
and test results, even those individuals who are honestly trying to 
apply for insurance without fraudulent intent may be exposed to 
policy rescission, even years after the policy has been approved. For 
these reasons, life insurers should include clear application questions 
regarding genetic testing, or be foreclosed from using failure to 
disclose such testing as grounds for rescission. Such clear rules should 
be in place in order for applicants to know how to answer questions, 
to better understand how genetic information is being used in the 
underwriting process, and to provide information to the many 
individuals like Susan, Timothy, and Alfred who struggle to decide 
how to prioritize access to life insurance with the decision to undergo 
testing to determine future risk of disease. 
 
